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Foreword
A primary mission of the Naval War College is to enhance the ability of our students to think
critically and to conduct rigorous and data-driven analysis of competing alternatives. When our
alumni return to the operational environment, they are better able to perform as effective decision
makers at the highest levels, in all conditions of peace, conflict, and war.
The College also has a role to play beyond meeting the needs of our student body, and that
is to facilitate thoughtful discussions among national security leaders, planners, and operators
through a series of wargames, simulations, workshops, and conferences. In pursuit of this larger
goal, we hosted the “Breaking the Mold: War and Strategy in the 21st Century” workshop in
March 2018. A broad overview of the topics discussed and some preliminary findings worthy of
additional study are detailed in this document. The goal of the workshop was to demand thinking
that was bold, yet based on fact and sound strategic and operational logic.
With a future that remains unpredictable, hugely dynamic, and in many ways more challenging
than at any time in our history, we need to rely on our intellect to shape and propose appropriate
constructs and strategies for ensuring the security of this nation and our many friends and allies.
As President, I am profoundly grateful for the hard work of the participants and organizers who
made this event possible. I am sure you will find much to consider within the pages that follow.

									
								

III

CHAPTER 1
Introduction to the Workshop/
Categorized List of Actionable Recommendations
The “Breaking the Mold: War and Strategy in the 21st Century” workshop was conducted under
the sponsorship of the Under Secretary of the Navy at the Naval War College on March 7–8,
2018. The fifty-nine participants were invited on the basis of their expertise in national defense
issues; their leadership, operational, or analytical experience within the Department of Defense,
Department of State, or other agencies or academic institutions; and their community reputations
as creative thinkers.
The workshop was intended as a functional “experiment” in a top-down approach to generating
novel ideas that “break the mold of conventional thinking” concerning necessary changes in the
national security plans, processes, and organization of the United States.
This depiction of the concept of experiment reflects the fact that the workshop was not conceived as
a stand-alone event, but was envisioned as part of an evolving process in generating “radical” ideas
in which other participants and the Naval War College faculty would subsequently participate.
Under Secretary of the Navy Thomas B. Modly provided the kickoff to the workshop. His extensive remarks covered the naval services’ need to “break the mold” in considering a future that
could be even more complicated and challenging than today’s. Secretary Modly’s full address
appears in this Report as appendix 1.
The workshop was conducted by Rear Admiral Jeffrey A. Harley, USN, President of the Naval
War College (NWC), assisted by Dr. Harlan K. Ullman, distinguished senior fellow and visiting professor at NWC. The participants were challenged to think “boldly and creatively about
the future with few restraints other than the laws of physics,” and that “the crucial guiding and
operative principle is to think boldly and creatively” so as “to provoke imaginative and even
counterintuitive” ideas.” These few restraints included the following entering assumptions (in
abbreviated form):
•

Budget appropriations will continue to be (far) less than is required to maintain the current
force structure, strategic and operational requirements, and deployments.

•

Power will continue to diffuse, empowering individuals and nonstate groups at the expense
of traditional states.

•

Serious potential threats will continue to arise from nonmilitary and nonkinetic sources, to
include “active measures”; cyber; creative use of economic and mercantile policies; intimidation; misinformation, propaganda, and misdirection; interference in domestic politics; and
more innovative use of military power to achieve political objectives.

•

Offensive, precision weapons and C4ISR will tend to dominate defenses, meaning deception
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and maneuver will be more critical. So too logistical and C4ISR networks will become more
vulnerable.
•

The doctrine of most states with advanced weapons stresses the advantage of firing the first
shot, that is, anticipating an enemy’s actions and striking preemptively.

•

Nuclear arms talks—INF and New Start—will fail and the United States will withdraw from
the JCPOA with Iran. But rather than resulting in an arms race, modernization will lead to
self-imposed limits on U.S and Russian strategic forces. Meanwhile, China will continue to
pursue a more technologically advanced but still minimum nuclear deterrent.

•

NATO will experience continued erosion as certain unnamed but known allies pursue different courses and Brexit distances the United Kingdom from Europe.

•

The U.S. political system will remain polarized and highly divisive, and growing deficits,
along with interest rate increases, will provide a major, possibly crippling constraint on military forces.

•

No global financial or environmental catastrophe will occur.

The future environment was described as follows: “In general terms, the world of 202X is one
marked by the continued diffusion of power and globalization. Qualitatively, the military forces
of the United States and several NATO and Asian allies, Russia, and China have become relatively equal in advanced capability, but with significant strategic distinctions. Russian forces remain
centered on Europe and the protection of Russia, with small but effective deployments abroad.
China’s military remains a high-low mix, with many PLA units less well-equipped than others
due to financial constraints.”
Against the future described above, the working groups were provided the outline of three strategic options to be used to guide responses to “war” in the 21st century and break the mold of
conventional thinking: (1) A “porcupine defense,” undertaken in part in conjunction with Naval
Forces Europe and focused on Europe and Russia; (2) Containing potential Chinese military
expansion within the “first island chain” with “a mobile maritime Maginot Line plan that cannot
be outflanked”; and (3) Greater reliance on special forces, cyber, and unmanned vehicles (UVs),
all broadly defined. A fourth area for examination is the question of how such options might be
implemented. This suggests (4) “Redefining the National Security Act and Unified Command
Plan, along with a reconstitution and regeneration of forces in which a smaller but highly ready
active-duty force would be dependent on a larger reserve or cadre component that could be mobilized when or if needed.”
To the degree there was a central idea permeating the four working groups in encouraging a
“break-the-mold” mindset, it was to induce ideas that would exploit a cost-exchange strategy
designed to defeat potential adversaries by circumventing, neutralizing, and containing their
strategic thinking.
As general guidance, the working groups were challenged to examine:
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•

What might these strategic options entail?

•

What basic assumptions would undergird each option?

•

What would be each option’s strengths and weaknesses?

•

How would the entire defense and manpower base support each option?

•

Would these options be affordable, given the reality of the resources available?

Appendix 2 contains the full statements of guidance and precepts for the workshop.
The workshop was organized using NWC resources and also received generous support from the
Naval War College Foundation.
To “prime the pump” and establish an atmosphere of “radical” thinking, a series of 12 point
papers on individual proposals were provided to the participants in advance. Some of the point
papers were referenced in the subsequent discussions, some were not. In addition to a contribution by the NWC Provost, Dr. Lewis Duncan, the point papers were drafted by faculty members
of NWC and the Naval Postgraduate School, primarily—but not exclusively—by members of the
NWC Center for Naval Warfare Studies. The point papers are included as appendix 3.

TASK
The overall objective of the workshop was to generate actionable recommendations that would
“break the mold” of current U.S. national security plans and processes. These recommendations
are intended to be briefed to selected decision makers and to be used for additional analysis by
NWC faculty members.
The entering assumption of the project, in the words of Dr. Ullman, is that “if we are serious in
pursuing a more lethal Navy [and more effective national security overall], we need to break the
mold of past thinking because, under those conditions, without a huge and virtually impossible
increase in budgets, that goal is not achievable for decades.” This entering argument provides
considerable incentive for creative thought and novel, nontraditional defense concepts. Yet at the
same time it requires grounding in the realities of the geopolitical environment and the realities
of cost and budget. While as novel as possible, the thinking also was required to remain within
the art of the possible, with the collective expertise and experience of the participants providing
the knowledge of that art.

FOCUS
In his address to the workshop participants, Under Secretary Modly pointed to the speed of
change as the prime motivator for breaking free of “organizational paradigms, and behaviors, and
biases.” He observed that after 911 DoD adapted “tactics and capabilities quite well” in militarily
addressing terrorist threats. However, this effort at “cracking the mold,” while successful, “may
not be enough because no longer are we faced with a single rogue terrorist actor, rather we are
faced with a broad and varied spectrum of them.”
3

Moreover, the new National Defense Strategy (NDS) identifies “changes that have eclipsed the
dangers these rogue actors, and rogue nations, have presented over the past decade. . . . We are
entering an era of great-power competition on a global scale, so we must be focused on responsibly developing forces that protect our people and our interests, our friends and allies around the
world.” Noting that “China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian
model and they will use whatever tools that are available to them, both lethal and nonlethal, legal
and illegal, to gain influence and authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions,” Under Secretary Modly described the NDS as providing a “mandate for how we
construct our naval forces” to address a “broad range of competing challenges” that include:
•

A return to great-power competition, but not to the exclusion of other threats.

•

An emphasis on lethality and readiness, but not to the exclusion of new platforms and technologies for the future fight.

•

A recognition that we must advance our nation’s interest and influence on the seas, but not
to the exclusion of building alliances and partnerships that seek peaceful conflict resolution,
with preparedness for the use of decisive force if necessary.

Under Secretary Modly suggested that the “preeminent focus” in breaking the mold of old paradigms was the need to achieve organizational “agility.” He defined the characteristics of agility
within the Department of the Navy in terms of providing “flexible, adaptable, faster development
cycles, reduced maintenance requirements, greater lethality, and an industrial strategy that sustains a modern, flexible, and sustainable industrial base.” To sustain the naval industrial base, the
mold of an “adversarial relationship with industry” certainly needs to be broken and “we must
also understand the difference between being a smart buyer and a bad customer.” Additionally,
agility in organization is needed to “recruit and train people who are innovative, creative, and
courageous, . . . who are comfortable with uncertainty and who can collaborate and trust their
teams and leaders under stressful conditions.”
The Under Secretary identified five organizational qualities that “will contribute to a more agile
Navy”: (1) velocity or speed, (2) adaptability, (3) collaboration, (4) visibility, and (5) innovation,
which is strengthened by a culture of lifelong learning. He concluded by predicting that “we will
have to break the mold” to truly embrace agility.

ORGANIZATION
The discussions were conducted and findings generated within four working groups. Each
group was organized around one of the themes previously suggested by Dr. Ullman. Group 1
was assigned the concept of a “porcupine strategy” for the defense of NATO/Europe. Group 2
organized around the concept of a mobile maritime barrier (“a maritime Maginot Line plan”) in
the Asia-Pacific. Group 3 considered “the new conventional triad” of special operation forces
(SOFs), unmanned systems, and cyber-warfare capabilities (a construct originally suggested by
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Admiral James Stavridis, USN [Ret.]).1 Group 4 considered a new National Security Act and
recreation of a national security organization, to include all U.S. government agencies.
A narrative of each of the four working group discussions and copies of their final outbriefs are
contained within this report as chapters 2 to 5, respectively. The briefing slides included were
presented to the full workshop, including the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William
Moran, USN. The slides represent the agreed-upon findings of each group. The narratives, in
contrast, attempt to capture discussions and conclusions on the basis of notes taken at the sessions. Although the narratives were drafted by individuals, the members of each working group
had opportunities to comment on their narrative following the workshop. While not claiming to
represent an absolute consensus, the report reflects every effort to come close to a common view
of what was discussed. Each group was allowed the discretion to brief and discuss its proceedings and findings in the way its members judged best. Despite core commonality, the narratives
and briefings of chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 are not strictly uniform in approach, style, or content,
but reflect the individualities of each group. In certain cases, they deviate considerably from the
guidance provided in the starting precepts, going far beyond, for example, the original concept of
a porcupine strategy or a mobile barrier.

CONSOLIDATED RECOMMENDATIONS
Since the workshop was not designed to form a consensus across groups and did not seek to prioritize recommendations, a consolidation of these recommendations does not reflect an order of
precedence or relative degree of achievability.
However, Group 1 did create a scattergram (also called a scatter graph and scatter plot) that
illustrates their recommendations on axes of difficulty (of achievement) versus effectiveness (in
potential outcome). This indexed graphic not only effectively illuminates Group 1 discussions,
but provides a potential plan of action for countering Russian “gray-zone” activities in the European region. It is contained in the briefing slide section of chapter 2.
Recommendations from other groups are not necessarily well represented by scattergrams;
however, it is possible to categorize all the recommendations into areas by which they could be
assigned more easily for action within the Department of the Navy or Department of Defense.
To place the recommendations of the four working groups within a context of Department of the
Navy/Department of Defense decision-making, they have been extracted from the narratives/
slides and reaggregated into the following four categories: (a) alternative strategy development,
(b) alternative operational planning and capabilities, (c) acquisition and R&D reforms, and (d)
organizational and personnel policy changes. Several of the recommendations could also fall
within multiple categories. If they were implemented, all could have effects and require changes
in all the categories.

1. James Stavridis, “The New Triad: It’s Time to Found a U.S. Cyber Force,” Foreign Policy (web edition), June 20,
2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/20/the-new-triad.
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a. Alternative Strategy Development
Group 1: A Porcupine Strategy for Europe
•

Grow Forward-Deployed Navy Force-Europe (FDNF-E) and tailor its traditional rotational
forces for deployment to specific areas within Europe/Middle East.

•

Restructure the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) away from traditional-force power-projection packages toward cost-imposing approaches (detailed in chapter 2) around establishing
a “no man’s land” extending out to a 200-mile radius in which no force can safely operate.

•

Deepen NATO cyberspace defense capabilities and enhance NATO counter-messaging centers.

•

Formalize procedures to allow swift formation and deployment of “coalitions of the willing”
for situations outside of NATO purview or when NATO will not act. In support of this, experiment with subregional organizations to complement NATO efforts.

•

Conduct strategic communications and information operations into Russia to disseminate
Western values and truths, while better illuminating Russian actions.

•

Stop avoiding contested international seas and airspace—without being unduly provocative—to preserve the current rules-based international order.

Group 2: A Mobile Maritime Barrier in Asia
•

Avoid an initial high-end maritime battle within the first island chain, and then operate within
the first island chain under carefully considered and delineated conditions.

•

Extend the U.S.-Philippines mutual defense treaty to include the Philippine claims of their
exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

•

Continue the U.S.-Japanese annual navy-to-navy ANNUALEX events, moving the location
to west of the Ryukyu Islands.

•

Employ a system of missiles, mines, and unmanned systems, at sea and ashore, to establish
land-based batteries across island chains in the Pacific for choke point control and denial and
localized sea control and denial.

•

Consider maritime forces as conducting “nonplatform-centric warfare” or “launch-platform”
warfare, under which anything that can launch an unmanned system, weapon, or sensor is considered a warship (rather than the “platform-based” war at sea characteristic of World War II).

•

Develop and deploy a U.S. maritime militia.

•

Address the speed of escalation and the control of that speed as an inherent part of the military competition.

•

Manage national hedging strategies to encourage allies and partners to deploy maritime militias even
in the face of questionable levels of cooperation with the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and others.
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•

Increase U.S. Coast Guard and allied coast guard operations in East Asian waters.

•

Increase presence in port facilities in Vietnam, Indonesia, and other nations (and political
leverage in those countries), thereby forcing China to face third-nation considerations in
actions against the United States.

•

Improve facilities in the Marianas, Palau, and Micronesia as logistics bases for U.S. and
allied actions within the second island chain.

Group 3: The New Conventional Triad
•

Develop a coherent strategy for the development and employment of the new conventional
triad of SOF-like fleet/unmanned systems (UsX)/cyber.

•

Integrate UxS as an integral element of distributed maritime operations (DMOs).

•

Ensure that the Force Structure Assessment implements the new conventional triad.

Group 4: Organizing for National Defense
•

Develop an integrated, whole-of-government national security strategy based on a national
security threat analysis, aligned with a unified national security budget.

b. Alternative Operational Planning and Capabilities
Group 1: A Porcupine Strategy for Europe
•

Bolster NATO force integration units (NFIUs) and Multinational Division-Southeast (MNDSE) Headquarters, including the use of theater special operations command (T-SOC) planning and execution processes.

•

Surge greater numbers of NATO ships and aircraft into the Black Sea.

•

Deploy antiship cruise missiles and air-defense systems into the Baltic and Black Seas to
counter Russian power-projection capabilities.

•

Openly stockpile land and naval mines in the Black Sea region while simultaneously preparing capabilities to clear straits and choke points in the event of conflict.

•

Deploy nationwide warnings and message-dissemination “apps” to produce “crowd-sourced”
information and to fight against disinformation.

•

Use mountain or underground facilities to harden key command and control, operational, and
warfighting facilities and systems.

•

Develop the capability to use swarming tactics, techniques, and technology in the gray zone
and in open conflict.
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Group 2: A Mobile Maritime Barrier in Asia
•

Deploy a completely autonomous, unmanned air wing by 2023.

•

Deploy a completely autonomous, unmanned surface and subsurface action group by 2028.

•

Develop a seabed-warfare capability (more than MIW, ASW, or USW), constructive and
destructive, for attack and defense.

•

Develop and deploy containerized missiles and drones for placement on vessels other than
USN warships.

•

Develop a full range of capabilities for deception operations and decoys.

c. Acquisition and R&D Reforms
Note: All working groups identified the need for significant—and severe—acquisition reform.
Group 1: A Porcupine Strategy for Europe
• Increase maritime SOF training and capability development (particularly for gray-zone
operations).
Group 2: A Mobile Maritime Barrier in Asia
•

Stop purchasing and deploying short-range aircraft.

•

Stop building and deploying high-signature surface warships and support ships.

•

Stop acquiring systems that must rely on forward-located shore bases.

•

Trade off new platforms to develop and deploy advanced, survivable 21st-century battle-management capabilities, to include targeting, weapon-target pairing, advanced tactical
decision aids, and information cloud.

•

Make the Kennedy the last CVN and procure air-capable ships of different types. (Note: This
will still allow the Navy to have seven CVNs in the fleet through 2047.)

•

Increase the payload-to-platform ratio on all warships, especially SSNs, with the use of
towed payload modules.

Group 3: The New Conventional Triad
•

Embrace prototyping, use commercial development, and focus experimentation on the elemental capabilities for the new conventional triad of SOF-like fleet/UsX/cyber.

•

Increase CRADAs with commercial AI businesses.
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•

Integrate capabilities for the new conventional triad, fully develop TTP, enable prototype
transitions, and protect from traditional Program of Record (POR) acquisition-management
procedures.

d. Organizational and Personnel Policy Changes
Group 1: A Porcupine Strategy for Europe
•

NATO: Delegate greater military response authorities to Supreme Allied Commander Europe
(SACEUR) and streamline the North Atlantic Council’s decision-making processes, all to
allow for faster force generation and more-timely action.

•

Integrate law-enforcement authorities and capabilities to better detect and act against provocations in the gray zone.

•

NATO: Stop investments by some nations in procurement of traditional large ships, aircraft,
and ground forces. Instead, encourage the procurement of small, inexpensive-but-lethal
platforms, such as suicide drone boats and unmanned aerial vehicles (such as Israel’s Harpy
weapons).

•

Stop using predictable deployment patterns and locations by avoiding “heel-to-toe” deployments.

Group 2: A Mobile Maritime Barrier in Asia
•

Take an expanded view of artificial intelligence, as an ecosystem within which the Navy and
its decision makers operate, rather than holding to a view that artificial intelligence is merely
another platform or technology.

•

Open critical technical specialties to midcareer accessions.

•

Ensure promotion is based on competence (i.e., decouple promotion from longevity).

•

Make Mandarin or Russian a required major for selected USNA/NROTC midshipmen (and/
or require all midshipmen to take courses in one of those languages).

•

Ensure that foreign affairs officers (FAOs) have a competitive career path.

•

Educate personnel in the “new” specialties of AI, information warfare, and robotics.

Group 3: The New Conventional Triad
•

Establish a cross-Navy strategic/asymmetric thinking unit to address the new conventional
triad of SOF-like fleet/UsX/cyber, and assess execution across programs.

•

Increase the capabilities of OPNAV N9I to ensure that the Force Structure Assessment implements the new conventional triad.
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•

Mandate that cyber threats be incorporated into all wargaming scenarios.

•

Mature the inclusion of AI as a tool for wargaming.

Group 4: Organizing for National Defense
•

Institute a “National Security Service” to create a career process that promotes maximum
interagency knowledge and experience and fosters cooperation between personnel assigned
to different agencies.

•

Develop national security SES/flag officers: well-rounded, senior DoD leaders capable of integrating whole-of-government approaches to respond to regional and global security challenges.

•

Establish regional interagency authorities (RIAs) in lieu of combatant commands and civilian-agency outposts, to include (1) a senior civilian head with deep regional experience, (2) a
military deputy (the former combatant commander) with authority over U.S. military actors
in the region, and (3) a civilian deputy with “regional ambassador” status and coordinating
authority over country ambassadors and other civilian organizations operating within the
region.

APPRECIATION
The President of the Naval War College would like to express his appreciation to all the participants for their contributions to the success of the workshop, especially the following individuals:
Carolyn Harney; Karen D. Sellers; Prof. John Jackson; Dr. Anand Toprani; Dr. Richard Moss;
CAPT Adam Aycock, USN; Prof. William Glenney; and Dr. David Cooper.
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CHAPTER 2
A “Porcupine Strategy” for Europe
The Issue
The nation and the Navy face a resurgent, revisionist Russia that seeks to challenge aspects
of the existing international order that Moscow views as impediments to its prosperity and its
rightful place on the international stage. To accomplish its goals, Russia is working to enhance
its buffer zones (especially into the Baltic and Black Seas), to extend its reach into the eastern
Mediterranean and the Arctic, and to control energy supply routes to Europe and Asia. Moscow
is enhancing its buffer zones by consolidating Russian control over Crimea, fomenting instability
in eastern Ukraine, encouraging fissures in NATO and the EU, and perpetuating frozen conflicts
along its periphery. Moscow also seeks the “Finlandization”2 of the Black and Baltic Sea countries, peeling these former Soviet and Warsaw Pact nations—and possibly Turkey—away from
the West and NATO.
Although Russia may use forms of indirect and diverse long-distance forms of coercion, such as
using energy resources as a lever, it likely does not have territorial ambitions in EU and NATO
countries. Likewise, Moscow’s pursuit of control over energy markets is tied to its desire for
domestic stability, since much of its economy and the government’s budget depend on exports
of petroleum and natural gas. The concept of hybrid warfare and the threat of the use of tactical
nuclear weapons to force conflict termination on terms favorable to Russia appear to be parts of
the Russian approach.3 Investments in international energy and the Arctic and procurement of the
assets needed to protect those investments may be viewed as parts of Moscow’s holistic approach
to using all elements of national power.

The Questions
How does the U.S. Navy prepare itself to succeed in a 30-year competition with Russia in Europe? What roles does the Navy play in supporting the U.S. national interest in maintaining
the rules-based global order in the face of the Chinese and Russian national interests in a power-based global order in which concepts of balance of power and spheres of influence prevail?

Ends: Assure, Deter, and Compel
Assure Allies and Partners—and Russia
Central to assuring allies and potential partners is the continuance of the U.S. commitment
to maintain and strengthen the rules-based international order, and doing so in the face of the
power-based global order that Russia and China are pursuing. The United States will continue
2. This term refers to the post–World War II situation in which Finland favored, or at least did not oppose, the Soviet
Union in the economic and foreign policy spheres without being politically aligned to Moscow.
3. The point in any conflict at which Russia would consider using tactical nuclear weapons is a point of analytical
contention. Terms used in this debate include escalate to deescalate and escalate to terminate.
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to respect the rights of sovereign nations to choose their own political, defense, and economic
relationships. In addition, the United States will foster respect for international laws and norms,
including freedom of navigation and the high seas.
In addition to assuring allies and partners, the United States will work to assure Russia that
the United States does not pose a demonstrable threat to Russia and will not act to undermine
Russian internal stability. Likewise, the United States should convince Moscow that Russia has
options other than becoming a “resource colony” for China.
The United States will work to safeguard the security of its allies and partners. In part, the United
States can promote collective security by setting conditions that enable NATO and the European
Union to spend more on defense, and by ensuring guarantees under article 5 of the North Atlantic
Treaty.
Deter Russia
Even as the United States is reassuring Russia, it also should deter some aspects of Russian
behavior that are attempting to impose Russia’s will, and in so doing to limit the national sovereignty and freedom of other states.
Deterrence will be applied to prevent subversion and threats of escalation in gray-zone actions
(i.e., situations in which military or paramilitary coercion is used, but cannot necessarily be attributed to Russia) that undermine NATO and other U.S. allies and partners. Actions will include
specific counters to prevent Russian manipulation of supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) systems outside of Russia. Of particular importance will be deterring Russian actions
aimed at separating Turkey from NATO.
Actions will be taken to delegitimize the concepts of spheres of influence and areas of privilege,
as these concepts undermine the independence of nations and groups within those spheres and
areas, and are an effort by Moscow to codify a “new normal” of dominance of its “near abroad.”
Actions will be taken to deter Russian employment of overt military force as a traditional form
of aggression, and other actions by Russia to neutralize maritime border states in the Baltic and
Black Sea regions.
Compel Russia to Stop
Recognizing that assurance and deterrence of Russia may not be sufficient, the United States
must have a set of capabilities and be ready to act to compel changes in Russian behaviors that
contradict international norms. Specific behaviors that must stop include:
•

Efforts to limit freedom of navigation (FON) and overflight operations in international waters
and airspace, with a particular focus on stopping unsafe intercepts of foreign aircraft and
dangerous overflights of NATO warships.

•

Jamming radio broadcasts, cellular networks, global positioning systems, and civilian communications within neighboring states, especially during nearby Russian military exercises.
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•

Intruding into and interfering with domestic political systems and processes in other nations
through cyberspace and disinformation campaigns.

•

Fomenting unrest in neighboring states through actions by pro-Russian ethnic groups and
mercenaries.

•

Using energy and energy infrastructure control as a political and economic weapon.

Means
The means to carry out the porcupine strategy for Europe are not in and of themselves new,
consisting as they do of a combination of conventional forces, SOFs, and cyberspace forces, all
creating a competitive advantage by exploiting disruptive technologies that have been emerging
from continual organizational innovation across the Department of Defense. In conventional
terms, what is new is using all three forces in a coherent manner to execute the “ways” discussed
below.

Ways
The series of “ways” are best addressed by the concepts of continue, commence, and cease.
Continue
The Navy should continue and grow its Forward Deployed Navy Force-Europe (FDNF-E) and
tailor its traditional rotational forces for deployment to specific areas within Europe and the
Middle East.
DoD should continue the European Deterrent Initiative (EDI) with investments in infrastructure,
prepositioned capabilities, expanded training of combined forces, and rotation of U.S. forces. At
the same time, the United States should restructure EDI away from traditional-force power-projection packages toward cost-imposing approaches through use of SOFs, electronic attack, suppression of air defenses, strike demonstrations, emplacement capabilities for improvised explosive devices, deployment of antitank weapons, training of civil-military and paramilitary forces
to prevent Russian destabilization efforts, and development of civilian “total defense” resistance
and resilience capabilities.
NATO should bolster NATO force integration units (NFIUs) and Multinational Division-Southeast (MND-SE) Headquarters, including the use of theater special operations command (T-SOC)
planning and execution processes, to enhance NATO capabilities.
NATO should deepen cyberspace defense capabilities and enhance counter-messaging centers
to project Western values and proactively provide real, truthful information to counter Russian
activities.

13

Commence
In recognition that current U.S. capabilities and actions are not sufficient for the future, the following capabilities and activities should be started:
•

Surge greater numbers of ships and aircraft into the Black Sea.

•

Deploy antiship cruise missiles and air-defense systems into the Baltic and Black Seas to
counter Russian power-projection capabilities. Openly stockpile land and naval mines in the
region, while simultaneously preparing capabilities to clear straits and choke points to prevent Russian attempts to close off these waterways or clear them in the event of conflict.

•

Enhance the readiness of NATO member forces, delegate greater military-response authorities to Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and streamline the North Atlantic
Council’s decision-making processes, all to allow for faster force generation and more-timely
action. Pursue organizational innovations and implement enhanced systems to ease command
and control, planning, information sharing, and crisis response.

•

Formalize procedures to allow swift formation and deployment of forces from “coalitions of
the willing” for situations outside of NATO purview or when NATO will not act. In support
of this, experiment with subregional organizations to complement NATO efforts.

•

Streamline U.S., NATO, and allied cyberspace and information operations planning and
approval processes, allowing more-effective employment of offensive cyberspace and information capabilities to dissuade adversary actions and to impose fiscal and social costs on any
adversary.

•

Deploy nationwide warnings and message-dissemination “apps” to produce “crowd-sourced”
information and to fight against disinformation.

•

Conduct strategic communications and information operations into Russia to disseminate
Western values and truths, while better illuminating Russian actions to disrupt U.S. and allied
domestic political processes and to expose the corruption of Russian leaders.

•

Distribute and disperse logistics facilities and capabilities to enhance their defense and system resilience.

•

Use mountain or underground facilities to harden key command and control, operational, and
war-fighting facilities and systems.

•

Implement comprehensive civil-defense actions to minimize casualties and maximize resilience and recovery, should combat occur.

•

Develop the capability to use swarming tactics, techniques, and technology in the gray zone
and the fight, should it occur.

•

Increase maritime SOF training and capability development.

•

Integrate law-enforcement authorities and capabilities to better detect and act against provocations in the gray zone.
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•

Simplify acquisition rules and processes to speed development and deployment of new capabilities and greater capacities.

Cease
The group identified three current actions that should cease:
•

Stop investments by some nations in procurement of traditional large ships, aircraft, and
ground forces because they consume precious resources, yet the capabilities or capacities
they provide may not needed. Instead, encourage procurement of small, inexpensive, but
lethal platforms, such as suicide drone boats and unmanned aerial vehicles (such as Israel’s
Harpy weapons).

•

Stop avoiding contested international seas and airspace—without being unduly provocative—to preserve the current rules-based international order.

•

Stop using predictable deployment patterns and locations by avoiding “heel-to-toe” deployments.

Figure 1 displays a notional set of “ways” that Group #1 articulated, arranged to portray difficulty versus effectiveness. The placement of any particular “way” is for illustrative purposes only;
that “way” could be adjusted on the basis of a more detailed review.

Conclusion
The Navy’s ability in the future to meet the demands of U.S. national security interests depends
on establishing a maritime strategy and making requisite changes in Navy culture to maintain
a deterrence and war-fighting edge over Russia in a 30-year competition in the gray zone and in
conventional and nuclear environments. Such changes should enable the United States to assure,
deter, and compel in Europe and against Russia as a peer military and a peer nation.

PNWC Remarks
•

The working group findings can be translated specifically into a “porcupine strategy” by
NATO members in the Black Sea region.

•

Making Russian attempts to coerce NATO members more expensive (in multiple dimensions)
and countering Russian active measures would complement NATO’s current posture (such as
Aegis Ashore in Romania) at relatively low cost.
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Figure 1: Potential “Ways” to Employ a “Porcupine Strategy” for Europe
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Figure 1 (continued): Potential “Ways” to Employ a “Porcupine Strategy” for Europe
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• Investing in international energy concerns and Arctic capabilities; extending assets it needs
to protect
• Pattern of coercion by energy manipulation. Employs all means of national power in a
“holistic” strategy

• Wants to be recognized an a major power and to engage with the U.S. and others
• Enhance its buffer zones, extend its reach to Eastern Med, and control energy supply
routes
• Consolidate its control over Crimea, & dominate Ukraine
• “Finlandize” (neutralize) Black Sea & Baltic states, “peel away” former-Soviet
Union/Warsaw Pact-states and Turkey from the West
• Exploring long-distance coercion; don’t think Russia has territorial aspirations against
Romania
• Concepts of hybrid warfare and “escalate to terminate” -- use nuclear weapons to
terminate hostilities on their terms

• Revise aspects of international order that keep it from prospering; claim its “rightful” place
in the international stage.

Framing Thoughts: Russia’s Intent
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•
•
•
•
•

•

•
•
•
•
•

Article 5 NATO guarantees will be fulfilled
U.S. commitment to strengthen international order
International norms & laws, including FON in international waters, respected
Security of allies guaranteed and partners will be safeguarded
Sovereign nations’ right to choose their own defense & economic relationships
respected
West will not pose a threat to Russia; will promote an inclusive & respectful
relationship
Russia has options for its future other than becoming a “resource colony” of China
West will not undermine Russian internal stability
U.S. will respect international law constraints & not be a force for instability
Arms control agreements will be respected
NATO & EU will spend more on defense

Assure Allies & Partners
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•
•
•
•
•

Employing overt military force in traditional forms of aggression
“Neutralization” of maritime border states
Imposing its will & limiting national freedoms of other states
Undermining allies & partners via subversion & threat of escalation
Legitimizing “sphere of influence” concepts & “areas of privilege”
thereby undermining states’ independence
• Codifying a “new normal” that sanctions Russian dominance of its “near
abroad”
• Manipulating SCADA systems outside Russia
• Working to separate Turkey from NATO

Deter Russia
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• Jamming broadcasts from neighboring states and in
neighboring states
• Intruding via cyber means into foreign political
systems/processes
• Fomenting unrest with pro-Russian ethnic groups in
neighboring states
• Using energy as a political weapon

ü Unsafe intercepts of aircraft and overflights of NATO warships

• Limiting freedom of navigation and overflight

Compel Russia to Stop:
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• Organizational innovation

• Disruptive technologies

• Cyber forces

• Special forces

• Conventional forces

Means
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• Bolster NFIUs (NATO Force Integration Units) and MND(SE) HQ

• Employing SOF T-SOC planning and execution efforts

• Enhancing counter-messaging center(s) to project Western values & factual information

• Deepening cyber defenses

• Tailoring traditional forces for deployment to specific areas

• Special Forces, Electronic Attack, SEAD / Strike demonstrations, IED emplacement capabilities,
Anti-tank weapons; Civil-military/para-military force training to prevent destabilization efforts,
“Total defense” civilian resilience/resistance

• But…restructure EDI away from traditional force power projection packages toward a
cost-imposition strategy with…

• Infrastructure investment; Additional prepositioning; Expanded combined training; U.S. force
rotations

• European Deterrent Initiative (EDI)

• Growing FDNF(E).

Ways -- Continue:
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• Exposing Russian leadership corruption

• Implementing enhanced information-sharing systems to facilitate C2 and planning

• Integrating law enforcement authorities/capabilities to detect and counter provocations

• Stockpiling – and advertising stockpiling – of land and sea mines

• Deploying & distributing ASCMs & AD systems to project A2/AD capabilities over Western
Black Sea to counter Russian power projection efforts

• Applying swarm technologies and tactics

• Conducting strategic comms into Russia to disseminate Western values and truths

• Surging greater numbers of ships into Black Sea to challenge Russia claims

• Simplifying acquisition rules to speed development and delivery of new capabilities

• Formalizing procedures to swiftly build and deploy “coalitions of the willing”

• Streamlining NAC’s decision-making processes to prompt timely action

• Delegating greater military response authorities to SACEUR

• Enhancing readiness of NATO member forces for faster force generation

Ways – Commence (1):
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• Experiment with sub-regional organizations to complement NATO efforts

• Organizational innovation to ease cross-boundary planning, info sharing, & crisis response

• Deploy nation-wide warning/message dissemination “apps” to off-set disinformation and
provide “crowd-sourced” information gathering

• Implementing comprehensive civil-defense efforts to minimize casualties

• Burying key capabilities

• Distributing logistics footprint for resiliency and protection

• Preparing strait clearance capabilities to prevent adversary blocking efforts

• Increasing maritime SOF training & capability development

• Better illuminating Russian efforts to disrupt allied and US political processes

• Streamlining U.S. & allied cyber/info ops approval processes

• Employing asymmetric means to counter adversary offensive cyber operations and publicize
them

• Employing offensive cyber capabilities to impose costs and dissuade adversary cyber ops

Ways – Commence (2):

27

• Deploying “heel-to-toe” forces by way of predictable deployment
patterns

• Avoidance of contested (international) seas and airspace

• Investments by some states in “traditional” large ships/aircraft/ground
forces

Ways – Cease:
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Commence
Delegate greater military response authorities to
SACEUR.
Streamline NAC’s decision making processes to prompt
timely action.
Formalize procedures to swiftly build and deploy
“coalitions of the willing.”
Shift NATO to a “wartime” footing.
Implement processes to take action via groups of like
minded NATO nations.
Simplify acquisition rules to speed development and
delivery of new capabilities.
Surge greater numbers of ships into Black Sea to
challenge Russia claims.
Expose Russian leadership corruption.
Conduct cyber intrusion into Russia to disseminate
Western values and truths.
Apply swarm technologies and tactics
Deploy & distribute ASCMs & AD systems to project
A2/AD capabilities over Western Black Sea to counter
Russian power projection efforts.

Continue
Grow FDNF(E).
Continue European Defense Initiative (EDI) in Baltics.
Tailor traditional forces for deployment to specific areas.
Deepen cyber defenses.
Enhance counter messaging center(s) to project Western
values & factual information.
Employ SOF T
SOC planning and execution efforts.
Stand up NFIUs (NATO Force Integration Units) and
MNF(SE) HQ.
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Approve organizational innovation to ease cross
boundary planning, information sharing, and crisis
response efforts.
Experiment with sub-regional organizations to
complement NATO efforts.

Stockpile – and advertising stockpiling
of land and sea mines.
Extend law enforcement authorities to allow arrest of
potential provocateurs.
Implement enhanced information
sharing systems to facilitate C2 and planning.
Conduct cyber operations to further messaging and
gather intelligence.
Employ offensive cyber capabilities to impose costs
and dissuade adversary offensive cyber operations.
Employ asymmetric means to counter adversary
offensive cyber operations and publicize them.
Streamline US & allied cyber/info ops approval
processes.
Better illuminate Russian efforts to disrupt allied and
US political processes.
Increasing maritime SOF training & capability
development.
Prepare strait clearance capabilities to prevent
adversary blocking efforts.
Distribute logistics footprint for resiliency and
protection.
Burying key capabilities.
Implement comprehensive civil
defense efforts to minimize casualties.
Deploy nationwide warning and message
dissemination “apps” to offset disinformation and
provide “crowdsourced” information gathering.

CHAPTER 3
A Mobile Maritime Barrier in Asia
The Issue
The nation and the Navy are involved in a 30-year, no-holds-barred competition with a peer
adversary in the western Pacific. The current international mold—the rules-based global order of
the post–World War II world—has been broken by the rise of China, the reemergence of Russia,
and other national-level changes. Yet with regard to sea control and power projection, the U.S.
Navy remains locked in its decades-old mold for maintaining and wielding maritime power.

The Questions
How does the U.S. Navy prepare itself to succeed in a 30-year competition in the gray zone, and
to deny, defend, and defeat along a continuum from inside the first island chain to the mid-Pacific?
What roles does the U.S. Navy play in supporting the U.S. national interest in maintaining the
rules-based global order in the face of the Chinese and Russian national interests in a power-based
global order?

Assumptions
Working Group #2 assumed that the nation and the U.S. Navy, over the course of a 30+-year
competition with China, would be able to prevail (although not necessarily winning every engagement or action)—but only if the changes delineated in this paper are made, and made quickly.
The length of this competition is much longer, the intensity much stronger, and its nature more
diverse than anything the United States and the U.S. Navy have experienced in over a hundred
years.
China and Russia are now, or soon will become, peer military threats against which the U.S.
Navy must be able to fight and prevail. Even if China does not grow into a peer military threat, it
will become one in the economic realm.
The group assumed that the Navy, as the protector of the rules-based world order, would have to
continue to be forward-deployed and forward-postured to succeed against a continuing-to-grow
China as the primary defender of a power-based world order. Furthermore, as China grows
economically, it will force a change from a world economy riding the tide of globalization to an
economy driven heavily by Chinese expansionism.
The group assumed that the United States would retain its 2018 treaty allies and partners in the
Indo-Asian region in the face of intense Chinese pressure, because of the strength of shared interests.
The group assumed that resource constraints will become tighter, with the budget being, at best,
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flat, and more likely decreasing as the impacts of the staggering $25 trillion national debt play
out.
The group assumed that over the next 10–15 years the rate of change of technology will continue
to increase as the cutting edge of technology runs away from DoD and the United States moves
deeper into the commercial world outside of the Western Hemisphere. The United States will not
have a technological advantage, and the U.S. government will not necessarily own the technology it needs for warfighting.

The Future War
For the time horizon of this work, the nature of maritime warfare in some ways will remain the
same as today, and in other ways will change dramatically. What is best characterized as highend war at sea will remain a distinct possibility. Despite promises to the contrary regarding
technology, fog, friction, and uncertainty will remain, and under many conditions will be more
extreme than in the past.
Nuclear war will remain a threat, to include use of tactical nuclear weapons at sea, and even if
the U.S. Navy does not use them, the Navy will need to be able to operate and fight in a battle
space where others may have used nuclear weapons.
The capability of state and nonstate forces to mass effects without massing forces and without
massing bases will continue to increase.
The lines demarcating the military from the nonmilitary increasingly will become blurred. The
differences between what is ethical and what is nonethical also will blur.
The manners in which war can and will be waged will increase, to include the employment of a
variety of nonkinetic electronic-warfare, information-warfare, and artificial-intelligence weapons. Frequent reference was made to the depictions and discussions contained in “Unrestricted
Warfare” by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui from 1999 as being more reflective of future warfare than any other document.
The application of maritime combat power will be less about traditional platforms and more
about what is best called “nonplatform-centric warfare,” disconnecting the combat power from
the hulls. The lines will continue to blur between military members and civilians as gray-zone
activities and the forces employed in those zones expand. The ladder of escalation will be steeper
and have many more rungs, presenting greater challenges to the fielding of effective forces, such
as maritime militia.
The changes anticipated for future competition and future warfare will precipitate a wider variety
of personnel requirements to man and support the Navy, and may well require a mobilization by
society and industry to meet the personnel and material demands.
The competition, and even the war, will be continuous; the level and intensity may wax and
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wane, but it will be continuous. The United States and the Navy must be ready for this duration.
The Navy must develop the capability to hedge against high-end maritime warfare while competing in the gray zone, space, the electromagnetic spectrum, and cyber space, and under the sea,
continuously.

Recommended Approaches and Their Implications
The group’s maritime strategy is to preserve U.S. geostrategic interests in East Asia, including
economic, military, and political interests, through maintenance of treaty alliances and partnerships. The overall concept, for the long term of 30 years, is to compete in the gray zone and deny,
defend, and defeat along a continuum of actions, and to do so from inside the first island chain
out to the mid-Pacific Ocean.
To execute this maritime concept, the Navy must grow in terms of numbers of platforms and aircraft and in terms of war-fighting capabilities, and must expand its capabilities to operate as part
of a joint and coalition force. The Navy must evolve from a heavily reactive posture and force
into one that is proactive—almost provocative—in meeting U.S. national interests.
The Navy will focus on the maritime threat in the Pacific as part of maintaining maritime lines
of influence in the region. For the U.S. Navy, Europe will become a secondary theater. Yet the
combination of U.S. budgetary limits and some degree of deglobalization may increase pressures
against the Navy being forward-deployed, at least to the levels and degree seen in the past five to
ten years.
This concept will provide a hedge against the high-end maritime warfare outside the first island
chain, allowing the Navy to optimize its strengths and capabilities. The goal will be to avoid an
initial high-end maritime battle within the first island chain, and then to operate within the first
island chain under carefully considered and delineated conditions.
The DoD and the Navy will act to vastly improve the maritime capabilities of allies and partners
in the region through continued U.S. investment, coupled with maximum investment by those
allies and partners. Disruptive technologies and unmanned systems will be a critical aspect of
these investments.
In addition, it will become more important that actions taken and decisions made by the United
States in the face of nearer-term challenges do not foreclose options needed to be prepared for the
longer term and for options needed to gain an advantage over the 30-year duration of competition.
The Navy will develop and conduct options to impress U.S. intentions on China by, for example,
extending the U.S.-Philippines mutual defense treaty to include the Philippines’ claims of their
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continuing to conduct the U.S.-Japanese annual navy-to-navy
ANNUALEX events, moving the location to west of the Ryukyu Islands. These options will be
pursued with the full understanding that China will object vigorously—diplomatically, economically, and quite likely militarily—against these allies and partners, and likely directly against the
United States.
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The United States will strive for continued allied and partner support and participation to deny
China sanctuary within the Yellow, East China, and South China Seas. In addition to developing
and deploying low-cost maritime capabilities as necessary to maintain presence inside the first
island chain and prevent the emergence of a sanctuary there, the United States and its allies and
partners will signal China continuously in this regard.

Key Competitor’s Likely Responses
The group’s assessment was that, regardless of the actions taken by the Navy, and probably by
the United States, these actions are unlikely to deter or change China’s long-term plans with
regard to the United States, with the result still being a fully modernized PLA and PLA(N) by
2049 or earlier. At the same time, it is likely that China will increase the speed of development
and investment in military modernization and economic expansion as the international situation
evolves over the next 30 years.
The Chinese will increase the use of political intimidation and economic and military pressure
against U.S. allies and partners—specifically the Republic of Korea, Japan, the Philippines,
Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, and Australia—all to attempt to counter the U.S. strategy.
Any actions by the United States and its allies and partners that appear to change the strategic
environment within the second island chain will be interpreted as threatening the power of and
domestic control by the Chinese Communist Party, or as weakening Chinese sovereignty within
the first island chain. This likely will cause the Chinese to react significantly and noticeably.
Arguably more important than the reaction by the Chinese will be reactions by U.S. allies and
partners to U.S. actions and actions by the other allies and partners (e.g., what would be the reactions of Indonesia and the Philippines to actions by the U.S. and Japan?).

Ideas to Break the Navy Culture
The group’s view was that the potential future environment and the demands placed on the Navy
require that the existing Navy culture—as reflected in its capabilities and its maritime strategy—
be changed in terms of its investments and divestments, as well as its approach to the 30-year
competition.
Invest and Divest to Deny, Defend, and Defeat
With the potential future war-fighting environment and the need for different capabilities, the
current Navy POM and related 30-year shipbuilding plan are not sufficient for the future. Not
only are new investments necessary, but new divestments also are needed. Ideas to invest and
divest to deny, defend, and defeat include:
•

Stop purchasing and deploying short-range aircraft.

•

Stop building and deploying high-signature surface warships and support ships.

34

•

Stop acquiring systems that must rely on forward-located shore bases.

•

Trade off new platforms in order to develop and deploy advanced, survivable, 21st-century
battle-management tools, to include targeting, weapon-target pairing, advanced tactical decision aids, and information cloud.

•

Make John F. Kennedy the last CVN and procure air-capable ships of different types. (Note:
This will still allow the Navy to have seven CVNs in the fleet through 2047.)

•

Deploy a completely autonomous, unmanned air wing by 2023.

•

Deploy a completely autonomous, unmanned surface and subsurface action group by 2028.

•

Develop a seabed-warfare capability (more than MIW, ASW, or USW), constructive and
destructive, for attack and defense.

•

Increase the payload-to-platform ratio on all warships, especially SSNs, with the use of
towed payload modules.

•

Develop and deploy containerized missiles and drones for placement on vessels other than
USN warships.

•

Develop a full range of capabilities for deception operations and decoys.

•

Employ a system of missiles, mines, and unmanned systems, at sea and ashore, to establish
land-based batteries across island chains in the Pacific for choke point control and denial, and
localized sea control and denial.

•

Consider the maritime force as conducting “nonplatform-centric warfare” or “launch-platform warfare,” in which anything that can launch an unmanned system, weapon, or sensor
is considered a warship, rather than the “platform-based” concept of war at sea, as in World
War II. The entities of vehicles, weapons, and sensors should be considered more important
than the traditional platforms.

•

Take an expanded view of artificial intelligence as an ecosystem within which the Navy and
its decision makers operate, rather than holding to a view that artificial intelligence is merely
a platform or another technology.

•

Educate personnel in Chinese languages. Make Mandarin (and Russian) required majors for
selected USNA/NROTC midshipmen and/or require all midshipmen to take courses in Mandarin (or Russian).

Competing in the Gray Zone for 30 Years
Competing in the gray zone, and doing so for three decades, requires a different mind-set and
approach to maritime activities than the U.S. Navy has used. The Navy should:
•

Develop and deploy a U.S. maritime militia.

•

Address speed of escalation, and control of that speed, as an inherent part of the competition.
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•

Manage national hedging strategies to encourage allies and partners to deploy maritime militias, even in the face of questionable levels of cooperation with the Philippines, Malaysia,
Thailand, and others.

•

Increase U.S. Coast Guard and allied coast guard operations in East Asian waters.

•

Increase presence in and political leverage through port facilities in Vietnam, Indonesia, and
other nations, thereby forcing China to face third-nation considerations in actions against the
United States.

•

Improve facilities in the Marianas, Palau, and Micronesia as logistics bases for U.S. and
allied actions within the second island chain.

•

Educate personnel in the “new” specialties of AI, information warfare, and robotics.

•

Ensure promotion cycles are based on competence (rather than longevity).

•

Consider opening skilled technical billets to midcareer hires.

•

Ensure that foreign affairs officers (FAOs) have a competitive career path.

Conclusion
The Navy’s ability in the future to meet the demands of U.S. national security interests is tied to
a maritime strategy and requisite changes in Navy culture that allow success in a 30-year competition in the gray zone, and denying, defending, and defeating along a continuum from inside the
first island chain to the mid-Pacific against China as a peer military and nation.

PNWC Remarks
Although the image of a “maritime Maginot Line plan” may seem paradoxical to those who view
such a defense as failure, the actual Maginot Line was never penetrated by the Germans; they
needed to outflank it to engage the Allied forces. A mobile maritime barrier could function the
same way, by forcing the PLA to forgo attempting to build a global navy and confine their ambitions to the land.
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• Decreasing budget: resource constraints
• Must be able to compete forward with naval power with China,
whose ability will continue to grow (Rules-based order is part of US
existential calculus)
• US will retain our current treaty allies in Asia, in face of Chinese
competition, with shared interests
• TOT is ~30 years, during which the US is able to compete
• 10-15 years for budget, technology: rate of change will continue to
go up
• US will be able to compete with China over the 30-year period, but
only with required changes

Assumptions

39

• Steeper escalation ladder

• Different personnel
requirements: mobilization
required for
personnel/industry

• Increased ability to mass
effects without mass bases
e.g., CVs, land)

• Nuclear war will remain a
threat

• Fog/friction/uncertainty will
remain

• Non platform-centric warfare

• Gray forces: blurring of
military/civilian sectors

• High end war at sea will
remain

Ways War Will Remain War

• Increasing ways to wage war,
e.g., non-kinetic (EW, IW, AI)

Ways War Will Change

The Future War
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Navy must grow in numbers and capabilities

•

Hedge against high-end maritime warfare outside the First
Island Chain—optimize Navy’s strength

Develop and conduct options to impress US intentions on China
(e.g., extend US-RP mutual defense treaty to include Manila’s
claims in the Philippines’ EEZ as falling under US-RP mutual
defense treaty; Conduct Annualex west of the Ryukyus)

Tie future investments to strategic maritime concept is
to compete in the Gray Zone: deny, defend, defeat
along a continuum from inside the First Island Chain
to mid-Pacific

•

•

•

•

•

Continue/vastly improve allied maritime capabilities with
maximum indigenous investment

•

China will object vigorously diplomatically and economically
against the Philippines and to a degree the US

USN will have to operate as part of a joint force

Develop and deploy the low-cost systems necessary to maintain
US/Allied presence inside First Island Chain

US avoid initial high-end maritime battles; operate inside First
Island Chain only under carefully delineated conditions

•

Navy focus on maritime threat in the Pacific as part of
maintaining maritime line of influence (Europe as secondary
theater)

US must have continued allied support/participation to deny
the three seas from becoming Chinese sanctuary—and Beijing
thus signaled

Disruptive technologies, unmanned systems will prevail

•

•

Implications

•

*Preserve US geostrategic interests in East Asia: economic,
military security, political through treaty allies

•

Recommendations

Recommended Strategies & Their
Implications
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• Beijing will increase efforts through political intimidation and
economic/military pressure against US allies/partners--ROK, Japan, RP,
Taiwan, Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, and even Australia

• China will increase speed of/investment in military modernization and
economic expansion

• Chinese will react significantly and noticeably to change in the strategic
environment within the Second Island Chain interpreted as a threat to
their national security interests: maintaining CCP in power, guarding
claimed Chinese sovereignty inside the First Island Chain

• Unlikely to change/deter China’s long term plans with the US (i.e., fully
modernized PLA by 2049)

Key Competitor’s Likely
Responses
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• Promotion cycle must be based on competence, not just tenure
(except in rare instances for the latter)
• Open billets to mid-career hires (military and civilian sources)
• Change incentives for officers to attend PME as well as their
instructors
• Educate personnel in the “new” specialties, such as
AI/IW/EW/Cyber/Robotics….
• Educate personnel to learn Mandarin or Cantonese and ensure
FAO is a competitive career path
• Make alternative required major for USNA/NROTC students
Mandarin/Cantonese as well as engineering/sciences

Implications for Naval Education
Review
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• Trade-off advanced platforms to achieve advanced, survivable 21st century battle management

• Employ joint missile/mine/drone forces (sea and shore-based) to establish island chain batteries
(choke point denial)

• Employ containerized missiles and drones on atypical craft

• Increase payload to platform ratio: e.g., SSN-towed payload modules as part of trade-off with SSNs

• Seabed warfare capability, both constructive and destructive

• Plan to deploy a completely autonomous surface and sub-surface action group within 10 years (UUVs,
USVs)

• Plan to deploy a completely autonomous (unmanned) air wing within 5 years

• Halt purchasing short-range aircraft; halt high-signature surface vessels; halt acquiring systems
requiring forward shore bases

• JFK the last CVN (7xCVN in the fleet until 2047…air-capable ships will continue)

Ideas to Break the Culture: Invest/Divest
to Deny, Defend, Defeat
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• Improve facilities in Marianas and Palau as Second Island
Chain logistics bases

• Increase presence/leverage with port facilities in Vietnam,
Indonesia

• Increase USCG and Allied CG units in East Asian waters

• Managing national hedging strategies to encourage allied
nations to deploy maritime militias (allowing for questionable
cooperativeness of RP, Malaysia, Thailand, ….)

Ideas to Break the Culture: Competing in
the Gray Zone

CHAPTER 4
The New Conventional Triad:
A SOF-Like Fleet/Service, Unmanned Systems, and Cyber
Introduction
Shortly after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions against
Iraq through Resolution 661. With these new authorities, the Navy went to work in the Northern Arabian Gulf (NAG). The mission—sea control or blockade—might not have been new, but
there were new challenges, such as those presented by the use by the adversary of cellphones
and GPS, which required adaptation, innovation, and the right support to succeed. The Navy rose
to the challenge. One could argue that the whole of the government rose to the challenge, if the
diplomatic successes and the efforts in admiralty claims are also considered.
Fast forward to the Global War on Terror and the last ten years. This conflict has been dominated
by special operations forces (SOFs). In the crucible of constant combat, SOFs have advocated for, and received, authorities for a more efficient acquisition process. They have developed
tactics, techniques, and procedures that support agile operations. Embracing technology, they
have become the most lethal human-machine weapon on the planet. And they have developed
a professional culture that rewards (because it requires) innovative thinking. The challenge for
the rest of the Navy—the institution and the fleet together—is to become “SOF-like.” The fleet
can do it, with institutional support, as it did “back in the NAG.” According to the new National
Defense Strategy and the latest Program Objective Memorandum (POM), the nation not only
expects it but is putting the resources it can behind the effort. How must the Navy—the fleet and
the overall institution—change?

The Issue
We are in a simmering war—operating phases of complex warfare—worldwide. The mold of our
post–WWII global system is being broken, regardless of our involvement (or lack of involvement) in the process. Current acquisition processes and levels of resource allocation are neither
aligned nor agile enough to effectively counter current adversary efforts. Nor can they prepare
the fleet for the full spectrum of future conflicts in an innovative fashion. A new course must be
set and a higher speed of advance achieved if the Navy is to remain a viable tool for the nation in
future competitions and conflict.

The Questions
How do we take the lessons of the last decade from our most seasoned, combat-effective, and
successful forces (i.e., SOFs) and apply them to the Navy’s institutional processes and the fleet’s
culture to create a Navy that is as reactive, agile, and effective as SOFs; that capitalizes on the
potential for cost-effective results from an integrated unmanned system (UxS)-human fleet; and
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that incorporates systemic cyber resilience while also providing offensive and defensive cyber
capabilities?

Discussion
“You go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time.”
~ Former Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld

We know today that there will be future conflict. We know that the current and future fleet is
likely not optimized for that future conflict. While the former SECDEF’s words will always ring
true, we can mitigate the negative effects of this inevitability by taking the rudder in hand today
and shaping a better course for the future fleet. As it turns out, we have done this before.
Consider the challenge Marines overcame on November 25, 2001. More importantly, consider
the tools the Marines had available that enabled them that day to conduct an amphibious assault
more than 400 miles inland, taking the Taliban (and the world) by surprise. No beachhead was
established—amphibious doctrine was thrown out the porthole. However, the conditions had to
be set to make such a daring endeavor conceivable. Marine amphibious units were given additional special operations training. Capabilities such as inflight refueling were developed. Equipment, such as fuel bladders, were deployed. And most importantly, the culture throughout the
Corps had been shaped to create a more SOF-like attitude, rather than a “storm the beach and
catch bullets” attitude.
Wikipedia states that the purpose of the nuclear triad is “to significantly reduce the possibility
that an enemy could destroy all of a nation’s nuclear forces in a first-strike attack; this, in turn,
ensures a credible threat of a second strike, and thus increases a nation’s nuclear deterrence.” Realizing a need in the short, medium, and long terms to create effects that can deter an adversary
(or adversaries), a new triad of capabilities must be developed to keep the Navy, and therefore
the nation, relevant in global affairs. The new triad is:
•

A SOF-like fleet/service. This is about people and culture.

•

Unmanned systems (UxS). This is about platforms.

•

Cyber. This is about electrons.

The purpose of this new triad—in effect, the future “fleet”—is to significantly reduce the possibility that an enemy could have a lasting, permanent effect on the global order; this, in turn,
ensures that the Navy and the nation (and the established global order) remain viable, and thus
increases our nation’s resilience and deters adversary action.
Additionally, the adversary understands the American preeminence in conventional conflicts. As
a result, today’s adversary(ies) have developed operations for which the United States government either does not have an option, short of response with its conventional forces, or the option
is politically too costly, in the domestic or international sense. Developing the new conventional
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triad provides the Navy, and the nation, with the necessary response options to adversaries’ current initiatives (see figure 1 below).4

Figure 1. Modern Spectrum of Conflict

Our fleet is configured for that high-end conventional fight. As a result, many of the weapons
pairings available to the fleet are not cost-effective for employment in less-than-conventional conflict. For example, a single SM-6 costs millions of dollars. Combined with the limited
number of Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells in surface combatants and the competition for
other weapons, such as Tomahawk, to be available, current surface combatants will not have the
quantity of necessary effects available. Other solutions, such as directed energy (DE) and railgun technologies, provide affordable solutions that increase the number of rounds available at
a significantly lower cost per “round,” or firing. Forced to operate in the spectrum of conflict at
a level that avoids confronting U.S. conventional forces, our adversaries are well aware of our
weapons costs and are potentially outpacing our efforts to develop DE and railgun technologies.
This appears evidenced by recent reports that China now has put to sea to test the world’s first
railgun. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy’s railgun—which was well ahead of China’s only a couple of
years ago—has been relegated to the storage yards in Dahlgren because of a lack of funding.
Next, consider the fact that the federal government no longer leads the nation in research-anddevelopment (R&D) investment. The ratio between federal government and industry investment
in R&D has essentially flipped, with industry funding over sixty cents of every investment dollar.
(See figure 2 below.)

4. Derived from a discussion led by Dr. Jackie Schneider of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War
College.
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Figure 2.5

While there are many implications, for this discussion the salient point is that industry has capabilities that the Navy can leverage. However, this should not be done in the traditional fashion, in
which the technology or capability is incorporated through Navy processes and brought into the
fleet, which then goes off to the fight. Consideration should be given to making industry’s R&D
leaders partners in the fight. Some of those in American industry consider themselves to be in the
fight already, and they have learned lessons, developed their own TTP, etc. Going into conflict
with industry as a partner presents challenges with regard to authorities and access to information, but those challenges are not insurmountable.
Attributes we (should) value:
•

Agility

•

Physical platform constraints

•

Education

•

Critical thinking

•

Cost-effective effects

•

Distributed

•

Proportionality

•

EMP-hardened

5. “U.S. R&D Increased by More Than $20 Billion in Both 2013 and 2014, with Similar Increase Estimated for
2015,” National Science Foundation, September 15, 2016, https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2016/nsf16316/.
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Assumptions/weaknesses:
•

No Cold War Navy environment

•

Homeland defense is of key importance

•

Technology is changing rapidly

•

Navy personnel system is broken

•

Navy does not manage talent well

•

Navy does not value education

•

Poor/traditional investment strategy

•

U.S. dominance is an illusion

•

Navy lacks interest in new technologies

•

Commercial R&D is dominant

•

There is a distinction among autonomy, unmanned, and artificial intelligence—and it is not
understood

•

AI is not present in today’s Navy

•

Future engagements will look like SOF operations

•

Plan on being surprised

•

<3% of GDP will be spent on defense

Other points to consider:
• The fleet is a system
•

Every ship is a node

•

Trends should be toward more/smaller/distributed

•

Combat system shouldn’t know or care where the lifelines are

•

Cyber doesn’t care where borders are
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Analysis
SOF
As Is
(traits current SOFs exhibit
that we need in the fleet/
institution
• Authorities
• Speed
• Unacknowledged
• Precision
• Faster flash-to-bang
• Economical
• Limited scalability
• Phases 0, 1 & 5
• Multidimensional
• Higher acceptance of risk
• Q-ships

To Be
(traits the future fleet/
institution should adopt
from SOFs)
• Planning process
• In plain sight
• Focused/precision effects
• {May not be big bang}
• {May prevent big bang}

How Do We Implement?

As Is

To Be

How Do We Develop?

• Mostly commercial
• Rigid acquisition process
• Entrenched PORs resist new
ideas

• Plentiful
• Cheap (sort of)
• Distributed
• Integrated
• Not perfect
• Space capabilities
• Open/modular

• Open/modular
• Need prototype process
• Evolve or die
• Change acquisition process
• Buy as commodity
• SCN: No
• Virtual/mixed reality &
gaming
• Training & experimenting
• AI refined targeting
algorithms

• Change culture
• Integration

UxS
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Cyber
As Is
(traits of current cyber
capability/forces

To Be
(desired cyber capabilities/
traits)

How?

• Offensive: platform agnostic
• Defensive: every platform &
system
• Unclear C2 & integration of
effects

• Ubiquitous (Red & Blue)
• Supply chain vulnerability
• Decomposable
• Ability to operate in cyber
environment
• C2 & integrated effects
• Clear authorities
• Shared access
• Systemic resilience

• Change in C2 structure
• Joint
• Game & exercise
• Speed of light
• Doctrine

Recommendations
Short-term effects:
•

Establish a cross-Navy strategic/asymmetric thinking unit to address the new conventional
triad to assess execution across programs

•

Ensure the Force Structure Assessment implements the new conventional triad (deepen N9I)

•

Develop a coherent strategy for the development and employment of the new conventional
triad

•

Embrace prototyping, use commercial development, focus experimentation on elemental
capabilities

•

Mandate incorporation of cyber threats into all wargaming scenarios

•

Increase CRADAs with commercial AI businesses

Medium-term effects:
•

Integrate UxS as an integral element of distributed maritime ops (DMO)

•

Value the fleet as a connected/connectible entity that is able to sense, understand, affect, and
adapt

•

Integrate capabilities, fully develop TTP, enable prototype transitions, protect from large
PORs

•

Mature AI (wargaming)
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Long-term effects:
•

Future state: Conventional triad fully integrated as elements of a connected/connectible fleet

Conclusion
The single greatest obstacle to developing the new conventional triad—the thread that can be
found in the decisions that brought us to the current reality and that prevent addressing projected future conflict—is the inflexibility of the Navy’s institutional resource-allocation process. It
prevents agility in acquisition processes, in developing and resourcing an essential and modern
continuum of education, and in realizing potential cost efficiencies available through partnership
with commercial efforts.
This must change. It must change for us to create an institution with the flexibility and agility
necessary to resource a future fleet that is more SOF-like, integrated with UxS, and cyber-resilient
and -capable.

PNWC Remarks
The conclusion corresponds to Under Secretary Modly’s call for a focus on agility. A more agile
resource-allocation process—one that is adaptable, collaborative rather than contested, and that
promotes innovation—could use an iterative process to institutionalize “radical” change. If
we are to be successful, change cannot be avoided. However, it need not be so disruptive as to
require efforts at mediating collateral damage to combat-proven practices. The goal of “radical”
thinking should include an examination of how best to implement the change, in such a way that
it seems a natural evolution in capabilities. To some extent, the increase in SOFs that has occurred since 2001 does constitute a radically different approach to global capabilities, but it has
been carried out in a way that appears to increase overall conventional capabilities. To slightly
modify a traditional Chinese proverb: “About the best changes, we will say, ‘We did them ourselves.’”
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Obstacles: Acquisition processes, mind sets, and resource allocations are neither aligned nor
agile enough to effectively counter current adversary efforts or prepare for the full spectrum of
future conflicts in an innovative fashion.

Goal: Create tenets of a Navy that are cost-effective, proactive, agile, and precise as SOF, to
capitalize on the potential of cost-effectiveness of an integrated UxS-human fleet, and that
incorporates systemic cyber resilience and robust offensive and defensive capabilities.

Why: We are in a simmering war, or at least operating within some phase(s) of this complex
warfare, worldwide. Said another way, the mold (our post WWII global system) is being
realigned regardless of DoD’s involvement (or lack of involvement) in the process.

Background/Assumptions:
• Technology changing rapidly and beyond gov’t control
• US dominance is an illusion
• Plan on being surprised
• <3% of GDP will be spent on Defense

The New “Conventional” Triad:
A SOF-like Fleet/Service, Unmanned Systems
(UxS) & Cyber/AI
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Promote people who get out in front of UxS, cyber, and SOF-like capabilities/culture.

Short Term:
- Establish a cross-Navy strategic/asymmetric thinking unit to address the new conventional triad to
assess the execution across programs
- Ensure the Force Structure Assessment implements the new conventional triad (deepen N9I)
- Develop a coherent strategy for the development and employment of the new conventional triad
- Embrace prototyping, use commercial development, focus experimentation on the elemental
capabilities
- Mandate cyber threats incorporated into all wargaming scenarios
- Increase CRADAs with commercial AI businesses
Medium Term:
- Integrate UxS as an integral element of Distributed Maritime Ops (DMO)
- Value the Fleet as a connected/connectible entity that is able to sense, understand, effect, adapt
- Integrate capabilities, fully develop TTP, enable prototype transitions, protect from large POR
- Mature AI (wargaming)
Long Term:
- Future state: Conventional Triad fully integrated as elements of a connected/connectible Fleet

Recommendations

CHAPTER 5
Organizing for National Defense
Background
The National Security Act of 1947 restructured U.S. military and intelligence agencies after
World War II. The Act, since amended, combined with appropriations laws and other processes,
has provided for ongoing changes to the overall national security organization.
There is substantial literature that considers the depth, breadth, and complexity of forecasted
threats to national security and the internal challenges the national security organization faces to
meet those threats effectively. Rather than adding to that considerable volume of work, the group
focused on exploring a few key practical changes that would better serve not just the military,
but the whole of government’s national security efforts. While these changes may not seem bold
individually, implementing them would serve to break the mold of the current national security
construct, enabling unified, comprehensive delivery of U.S. national power and influence.

The Issue
While the National Security Strategy informs the National Defense Strategy, which in turn
informs the National Maritime Strategy as well as the other service strategies, the bureaucracies created to execute these strategies and responsible for doing so—thereby providing
whole-of-government solutions to address national security concerns—are not geographically or
operationally aligned and synchronized. The development of effective whole-of-government responses is impeded further by overlaps in responsibilities and authorities, resulting in duplicative
tasking, and sometimes gaps in roles and missions.
Issues that prevent developing, resourcing, and effectively and efficiently executing a unified
national strategy include:
•

An integrated strategy process that is not consistently aligned with budget development

•

Agencies that lack the experience and relationships to integrate planning and execution

•

An acquisition system that is unable to respond to anticipated and rapidly emergent threats in
a timely and cost-efficient manner

•

Lack of responsiveness owing to inadequate inter- and intraagency coordination and collaboration

•

Poorly aligned regional responsibilities that impede suitable coordination and dynamic response across the seams

•

A dire need for Congress to allow the national security apparatus to become more agile and
adaptive in providing timely responses to highly dynamic and complex threats; this requires
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appropriately increased levels of flexibility and decision authority
•

Overcentralized logistic/sustainment processes that are inadequate to sustain responses to
highly dynamic and complex threats

•

An inadequate long-term strategic assessment/planning process that fails to guide, shape,
change, and transform the national security apparatus at the rate necessary to address anticipated and emergent future threats

Since it is impossible to address all these (and additional) issues in any one workshop, the group
focused on generating a select group of ideas that would contribute to overall improvements in
the national security organization.

The Questions
What ideas would contribute to the development of an agile, whole-of-government decision-making
process that would align strategy/policy/budget against a common understanding of national
security threats; to the development of an acquisition/procurement/deployment process responsive
to these strategies; to the development of a cost-effective sustainment/maintenance process supporting implementation of these strategies; to the development of whole-of-government delivery
of American power; and to the development of a workforce capable of these crosscutting roles/
tasks? Additionally, how can the national security complex evolve to meet these needs and the
demands (threats and opportunities) of a new global environment?

Discussion
The bureaucracies responsible for national security have matured and grown over the course of
70 years. However, the original goals of the National Security Act of 1947—(1) breaking down
compartments, (2) allowing for a comprehensive understanding of the threat environment (“the
big picture”), (3) providing centralized leadership, and (4) preventing duplication and improving
communication—have not been realized. Recognizing this after the war in Vietnam and some
small-scale conflicts, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DoD)
Reorganization Act in 1986. While the act did improve operational military effectiveness—as
demonstrated in 1989 during Operation Just Cause in Panama—its effect was limited to the
armed services in DoD. The previously discussed issues concerning the bureaucracies responsible for national security remained extant, and in some cases became increasingly problematic.
While the military services were reorganized and interservice rivalry was reduced (though not
eradicated), the DoD bureaucracy continued with business as usual and its interaction with the
other bureaucracies remained weak. It is therefore a poor assumption that the DoD “has it right.”
Forced to improve by Goldwater-Nichols, the DoD does stands out from the other bureaucracies
responsible for national security. However, the appearance of relative effectiveness in DoD can
be attributed as much to the ineffectiveness of the rest of the national security apparatus as it can
to Goldwater-Nichols.
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The issues previously identified are certainly not unknown and they are not isolated to the U.S.
government’s national security organization. The U.S. government’s overall acquisition system is
widely acknowledged to be inefficient in comparison with the private sector’s. However, the nature of the congressional system and the impact of government spending on individual congressional districts obviously makes any change in organization and acquisition a political debate.
Bluntly, everyone understands the preeminence of the election cycle and its negative impact on
developing a comprehensive and coherent national strategy. Reforming the system remains a
permanent challenge—but that does not mean such reforms should not be attempted.
Our conclusion is that the present “fragmented government” approach, particularly with respect
to the national security apparatus—which won the Cold War—is not currently capable of effectively preparing for or responding to future threats. Fundamental changes can create a different
reality.

Recommendations
Concept 1: Create an Integrated National Security Strategy
Goal: Develop an integrated, whole-of-government national security strategy based on a national
security threat analysis, aligned with a unified national security budget to support the integrated
security strategy.
Problem: DoD, State, Treasury, Homeland Security, and other national security–related agencies/
organizations submit separate budgets that are not aligned to a unified threat analysis or a unified
national security strategy, so they create overlaps and inefficiencies, and even missed missions.
Congress authorizes, appropriates, and provides oversight to each budget in a similarly fragmented way, preventing holistic budgeting and oversight. The result is the lack of a unified USG
approach to national security. Such difficulties became particularly apparent during the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even when there is an effective interagency, integrated strategy
process, absent direct intervention by individual congressmen, any new requirements identified
by the strategy may have to wait as long as two years to get funding through the current budget
process.
Impediments: Agency/service/congressional committee stovepipes that are incentivized to preserve bureaucratic equities.
Solution: Create an integrated national security strategy based on a whole-of-government threat
analysis, supported by a unified national security budget—all through a process managed by the
president’s national security advisor.
Concept 2: Institute a “National Security Service” (NSS)
Goal: Facilitate a solution-oriented, interagency decision-making and national power–delivery
process. Codify a career process that promotes maximum interagency knowledge and experience
and fosters cooperation between personnel assigned to different agencies.
Problem: Difficulties exist in comprehensive interagency coordination and unbalanced resource
allocation between DoD and all other national security agencies, particularly State.
Impediments: Agency/service resistance to giving up control over resources. Lack of interagency personnel training.
Solution: Create NSS and encourage personnel to have at least one tour in an agency other than
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their own. Tours in other agencies should be career-enhancing, with expanded opportunities for
multiple interagency tours. Goldwater-Nichols is the inspiration for this proposal. This solution
will provide a breadth of understanding of whole-of-government power, resources, and processes
to senior leadership, particularly political appointees.
Concept 3: Create Regional Interagency Authorities
Goal: Integrate the delivery of U.S. power and influence abroad using a regionally aligned, interagency structure combining DoD and non-DoD agencies.
Problem: At present, implementing integrated U.S. strategy is ineffective and is characterized by
overlapping efforts, often poorly coordinated; unbalanced resources; and lateral communication.
Impediments: Institutional resistance; international concerns regarding intent and interoperability with counterparts.
Solution: In lieu of combatant commands and civilian-agency outposts, regional interagency
authorities (RIAs) should be established with a pyramidal leadership structure: (1) a senior civilian head, with deep regional experience, ideally NSS-trained; (2) a military deputy (formerly the
combatant commander), with direction and coordinating authority over U.S. military actors in the
region; and (3) a civilian deputy with “regional ambassador” status who has coordinating authority over country ambassadors and other civilian organizations operating within the region (e.g.,
Homeland Security, Treasury, Justice, Commerce, and the like). A possible interim step toward
this solution (if there is insufficient consensus on establishing the RIAs) would be the appointment of a civilian deputy to the COCOM who would be responsible for all Title 22 and Title 10
security assistance and cooperation programs in the region.
Concept 4: “Develop National Security” SES/Flag Officers
Goal: Develop well-rounded senior DoD leaders capable of integrating whole-of-government
approaches to solving regional and global security challenges.
Problem: Few senior leaders have the experience to effectively coordinate interagency solutions
or manage interagency organizations/processes. The Goldwater-Nichols Act did not incorporate
provisions concerning interagency cooperation.
Impediments: Current service personnel career-path requirements impede interagency interoperability to support whole-of-government solutions.
Solution: An alternative career path should be established that allows selected flag officers to
serve as national security leaders in joint and interagency environments. This would constitute an
effective adjunct to the proposal to institute an NSS, or the possible interim measure.

Conclusion
As the Goldwater-Nichols Act improved U.S. military effectiveness, allowing it to become the
most joint, lethal, and respected military in the world, so can and should improvements be made
to the overarching national security apparatus as a whole to sustain America’s preeminent superpower position. This must be done to enable the full extent of American power to be brought to
bear in a fully coordinated, effective, and agile way in addressing the increasingly formidable
threats of the future, both known and unknown.
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PNWC Remarks
Group 4 deliberately adopted a step-by-step approach to organizational change, not because
“breaking the mold” is not needed, but because amending the National Security Act is within
the purview of Congress, not DoD. However, the group explored how the Navy, the DoD, and
the administration could make changes that would create an atmosphere conducive to legislative
action.
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• Solution: An agile national security decision making process that aligns strategy/policy with
threat and budget; an acquisition/procurement process responsive to these strategies; and a cost
effective sustainment/maintenance process that supports implementation of these strategies.

• Inadequate long-term assessment/planning.

• Over-centralized logistic/sustainment processes not responsive.

• Congress: the need to involve as many districts as possible increases expense; oversight increases reporting,
thus bureaucracy, and thus expense.

• Acquisition death spiral: modernization increases capability and expense forcing us to buy fewer or spend
more money.

• Agencies lack experience and relationships to effectively integrate.

• Integrated strategy process not always aligned with budget.

• Obstacles/impediments:

• Delivering American power and influence effectively requires whole of government approach.

• Problem: How can the national security complex evolve to meet the demands (threats and
opportunities) of a new global environment?

Assumptions
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• Solution: unified national security budget aligned with integrated
national security strategy supervised by National Security Advisor.

• Impediments: agency/service/congressional committee stovepipes;
incentivized to preserve equities

• Problem: DOD, State, DHS, Treasury, and other national security
related agencies/organizations submit separate budgets that are
not aligned and create overlap/inefficiencies.

• Goal: Develop integrated national security aligned with one
unified national security budget to support an integrated security
strategy.

Concept 1: Integrated National
Security Strategy
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• Create national security service.
• Tours in other agencies should be career enhancing; expand
opportunities for interagency tours.
• Civilian and military components.

• Goal: Facilitate solution-oriented interagency decision-making
process.
• Problem: Difficulty with comprehensive inter-agency
coordination.
• Impediments: agency/service resistance to giving up control
over resources.
• Solution:

Concept 2: National Security
Service

66

• Solution: establish regional authority with civilian head,
military deputy with direction and coordinating authority over
U.S. actors in region.

• Impediments: institutional resistance; international concerns
regarding intent and interoperability (counterparts).

• Problem: Implementing U.S. strategy ineffective: overlapping
efforts; often poorly coordinated.

• Goal: Integrate the totality and delivery of U.S. power and
influence using a regionally aligned interagency structure.

Concept 3: Regional Interagency
Authority
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• Solution: Establish career path that allows flag officers to serve as
national security leaders in joint and interagency environments,
including one previously recommended.

• Impediments: Current service requirements impede inter-agency
interoperability to support whole of government solutions

• Problem: Few senior leaders have the experience to effectively
coordinate interagency solutions or manage interagency
organizations/processes.

• Goal: Develop well-rounded senior leaders capable of integrating
whole of government approach to regional and global security
challenges.

Concept 4: “National Security”
SES/Flag Officers
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Under Secretary of the Navy
Naval War College
Breaking the Mold Conference
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Thank you for the kind introduction, and thank you for the honor of addressing you today at
this appropriately titled “Breaking the Mold” conference. I recognize that the path each of you
has taken to be included in this audience today is unique, but also remarkable and worthy of
great pride and recognition. I also know that there are common threads among you or else you
wouldn’t be here: a love for YOUR country, a love for YOUR Navy, and an intellectual and
emotional passion for helping us get it right as we consider what national and maritime security
will mean in this new century. My own active-duty career in the Navy was relatively short, but
I have a profound appreciation for, and connection to, those of you who started along this path
around the same time I did in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Whether on active duty, as a Navy
civilian, or even in the private sector, we have all witnessed profound changes together during
the past four decades. These changes will impact the U.S. Navy and our nation for years to come.
The changes are coming at us fast—so we need to be prepared to break free of the organizational
paradigms, and behaviors, and biases that suited us in the last century. They are not well-suited
for today, and certainly not for the future.
When we were first confronted by terrorism on a massive scale on 9-11, many people realized
that perhaps simply “cracking the mold” was necessary to shift our focus and forces onto a new,
unconventional adversary. We actually adapted our tactics and capabilities quite well to address
this threat militarily, and we continue to assess and adjust how we can defeat them in the new
battle spaces of social media and ideology. After sixteen years of war with this type of adversary,
however, I think that simply “cracking the mold” may not be enough, because no longer are we
faced with a single rogue terrorist actor; rather, today we are faced with a broad and varied spectrum of them. We see this across every area of the world in which our naval forces must engage.
These transnational actors inspire each other and use the tools of modern technology and social
media to build connections across borders that threaten our people and our allies and friends
around the world. Some of them are actually states, like North Korea and Iran, who have recognized that their paths to survival are through an ascendance to great-power status of their own
making. They both have chosen to do so by directly and indirectly confronting the United States
in order to demonstrate our vulnerabilities, and in return to elevate their own prestige.
More alarming, though, in recent years we have seen changes that have eclipsed the dangers
these rogue actors, and rogue nations, have presented over the past decade. If you have read
our new National Defense Strategy, you will see this emerging challenge clearly articulated. Its
implications are alarming, and rightly so, and they will drive investments in our defense capabilities going forward. We are entering an era of great-power competition on global scale, and so we
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must be focused on responsibly developing forces that protect our people and our interests, and
our friends and allies around the world.
The National Defense Strategy is a very cogent and realistic document. It is aligned with the
National Security Strategy of the United States, which was published just a few weeks before
the NDS, and it very plainly directs the Department of Defense to Compete, Deter, and Win
alongside our allies and partners. It is a strategy that recalls President Reagan’s commitment to
preserve peace through strength, while enabling decisive victory in conflict if necessary. It is the
department’s preeminent strategic-guidance document, and it will set the course for the Department of the Navy for years to come.
As the strategy describes, great-power competition has reemerged as the central challenge to U.S.
security and prosperity, and this geostrategic fact is demanding prioritization and tough strategic
choices. It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their
authoritarian model, and they will use whatever tools that are available to them, both lethal and
nonlethal, legal and illegal, to gain influence and authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.
Both China and Russia aim to shift the regional balances of power to their advantage. It is their
stated intent to weaken or fracture the U.S.-led alliance and partnership network that has ensured
security and prosperity for so many around the world. If unaddressed, the erosion of the United
States’ military advantage vis-à-vis China and Russia could undermine our ability to deter aggression and coercion in key strategic regions. Therefore, we must correct the trajectory of the
past several years so that both countries understand that the United States is not in retreat, but
that we will advance our interests and influence around the world. Those interests are primarily
defined by actions that will promote global peace and prosperity, through what Secretary Mattis
describes as a “Constellation of Partnerships” with nations who share our values and security
interests.
While the strategy prioritizes the challenges from China and Russia, it does not ignore the growing and pervasive threats from North Korea and Iran, and it also continues our commitment to
defeat violent extremism and the horrors being perpetrated in the name of Salafist-based ideologies. In essence, it is a realistic strategy, but also a very ambitious one that cannot be executed
without a significant commitment of national resources and, perhaps more importantly, a significant application of national resolve and urgency—and an approach to maritime supremacy that
“breaks the mold” of conventional thinking.
As Secretary Mattis has stated, “In a world awash in change and increasing threats, there is no
room for complacency. History makes clear that no country has a preordained right to victory on
the battlefield.”
The Secretary is certainly correct that there is no preordained right to victory. Rather, it occurs
when a nation is prepared not only for the fight that it sees coming, but also when it is prepared
for the fight that it does not. So it follows that the NDS is structured to address the full range of
adversaries we may face in this rapidly changing security environment. The future joint force
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must be lethal and resilient in contested environments, disruptive to adversaries who seek advantages across the globe, and flexible enough to address and defeat threats across a broad conflict
spectrum.
Fundamental to this future force will be the preeminence of our maritime superiority because
America is, and will always be, a maritime nation. Command of the seas is central to our nation’s
security and prosperity, and our maritime forces continue to be in great demand around the globe.
China and Russia are heavily investing in expanding their conventional and unconventional naval capabilities, and Iran and North Korea present challenges to our naval forces in different, but
still very disruptive and dangerous, ways.
Therefore, given the increasing complexity of the competitive geostrategic landscape, the National Defense Strategy’s mandate for how we construct our naval forces must address a broad
range of competing challenges:
•

A return to great-power competition, but not to the exclusion of other threats.

•

An emphasis on lethality and readiness, but not to the exclusion of new platforms and technologies for the future fight.

•

A recognition that we must advance our nation’s interest and influence on the seas, but not
to the exclusion of building alliances and partnerships that seek peaceful conflict resolution,
with preparedness for the use of decisive force if necessary.

So what does this mean for you as think about how to break the mold of old paradigms and ways
of thinking? In a word, I believe that breaking the mold will require a preeminent focus on the
need for agility. Agility is the term that I believe best describes the overall organizational quality
that has determined, and will determine, who and what survives in any increasingly competitive,
rapidly changing, and unpredictable environment. This is the environment our Navy faces today,
so I think we will ultimately be judged by how well we transition our forces and our supporting
organizations to a future in which agility is their defining characteristic.
Therefore, we must advance agility when we think about and build our future force structure. We
need more ships and aircraft and vehicles, but that equipment must provide flexibility, adaptability, faster development cycles, reduced maintenance requirements, greater lethality, and an industrial strategy that sustains a modern, flexible, and sustainable industrial base.
We must also advance agility in how we manage the business mission of the department. We
must have faster access to accurate information and we must reduce the overhead and bureaucracy that impedes rapid decision-making. We must also understand the difference between being a
smart buyer and a bad customer. We cannot build and maintain an agile organization if we promote an adversarial relationship with industry. Rather, we must promote competition, but with
integrity, transparency, and collaboration around common interests.
Most importantly, we must advance agility when we think about our people. We need to recruit
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and train people who are innovative and creative and courageous. People who are comfortable
with uncertainty and who can collaborate and trust their teams and leaders under stressful conditions. We must also tap into the vast knowledge and spirit of the private sector as partners with
our men and women in uniform, as well as our civilian workforce.
While I believe we would all agree that the Navy needs to become more agile in all the areas I
just mentioned, I also think we would all agree that defining and, even more importantly, measuring agility is not a simple task. For most of us, agility is not unlike Supreme Justice Potter
Stewart’s famous statement about pornography. In commenting on the definition of pornography
and how it related to a particular movie that was at the center of a Supreme Court case, Justice
Stewart said, “I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be
embraced within that shorthand description, and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly
doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.”
I suspect that most of us could paraphrase this and say, “I shall not attempt to define what is
embraced in the term agility. But I know it when I see it, and many of the things the Navy does
today are not that.”
But we shouldn’t despair. There are some very concrete organizational qualities we can truly observe and measure to determine whether we are building and leading a more agile organization. I
would like to offer five of these qualities for your consideration. This is not a comprehensive list,
but I do believe that, if nurtured, each of these organizational qualities will contribute to a more
agile Navy—and as we progress in building and encouraging these qualities, “we will all know
when we see it.”
The first of these qualities is velocity, or speed. In a time of rapid change, organizations have to
learn to do things faster. Every major enterprise that has emerged as a leader in its respective
industry over the last 20 years has improved in this area—and often by quantum leaps. When you
started your careers, think about how long it took to shop for something in a catalog, or to book
an airline ticket, or to have a package delivered. Think about how long it took to transfer money,
or just get cash for spending. More significantly, think about how long it took for well-established institutions to lose their competitive advantages. Now think about Kodak, or General Motors, or Sears and Roebuck, or even a more current example of the Internet age, America Online.
Once the tide and pace of change begins accelerating, it is impossible to stop it. Speed is critical
to survival in such an environment. For the Navy, this speaks not only to how fast our weapons
can fly or how quickly we can move forces from place to place, it has much more importance
with respect to how it characterizes our processes and decision-making. When we look at our acquisition programs, for example, I think we can all agree that our lack of speed when compared
to commercial industry is clearly costing us money and stifling our ability to incorporate technologies at the velocity of change. The same applies to how long it takes us to hire qualified people,
or to move beyond them if they are unable to perform adequately. When compared to some of
our geostrategic competitors who have discovered ways to shortcut innovation through nefarious
means or who can more quickly leverage commercially available technology, our lack of speed
is quickly becoming a competitive disadvantage. In the end, if we don’t correct this trajectory, it
will end up costing us much more than just money.
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The second quality is adaptability. Agile organizations adapt quickly to changing conditions.
They do not allow themselves to stagnate or be overcome by changes in their environment.
Boston Consulting Group (BCG) has studied the concept of corporate adaptiveness and discovered that there are in fact concrete ways to measure a company’s capabilities in this regard. Not
surprisingly, when examined within competitive environments that are defined as particularly
“turbulent,” the most adaptive companies on the BCG index far outperformed those who were
lower on the scale. This conclusion seems obvious, but the overarching point of this work was
that a high adaptability score for such companies did not come by accident. Rather, those companies who successfully built adaptive organizations did so intentionally and invested in it commensurately. For us, this means that we must consider and invest in adaptability across the entire
Navy enterprise. We must foster flexibility in our people, design and construct both adaptable
platforms and force-deployment models, and ensure that both people and platforms are enabled
by flexible business and operational processes. We must also encourage an understanding of the
world and the geopolitical context in which we ask our forces to deploy. Our people must be
able to adapt to the multiple potential environments in which they may be asked to operate—and
fight. They cannot afford to be ignorant of them.
The third agility quality is collaboration. Collaborative cultures may appear to be on the opposite
end of the spectrum from bureaucratic ones. This does not have to be the case—and we cannot
allow it to be the case in our Navy. I have often observed that the Department of Defense, like
most great bureaucracies, is the great “self-siloing” organization. It tends to have an aversion to
working across organizational boundaries, and organizations and suborganizations have a bias
toward protecting themselves—along with their domains, their budgets, their identities, and their
hierarchies—fiercely. Some of this is to be expected in a culture that is inspired historically by
a traditional military command and control environment, but some of it also leads to unhealthy
behaviors that inhibit collaboration and resolutions that are in the best interest of the entire enterprise. Our propensity for siloing is perhaps one of the most difficult cultural challenges we have
to overcome—but we have to overcome it. Agile organizations collaborate across internal and
external boundaries, and most importantly up and down the chain of command. This collaboration fosters a greater enterprise appreciation of the organizational strategy, and encourages greater enterprise-focused solutions that are not simply optimized for a particular suborganization,
command, ship, SYSCOM, or program. This means that leaders in our Navy, whether they are
military or civil servants, must set very high standards for collaboration, openness, communication, fairness, compassion, intensity, and commitment if there is any hope of impacting culture in
a positive way that enhances overall agility. Leaders must demonstrate zero tolerance for organizational silos and an aversion to the accumulation of power, while building broad coalitions
that align resources and momentum in a common direction. Fostering greater collaboration as a
critical cultural characteristic will also help us improve our ability to work with allies and partners around the world whom the NDS identifies as critical to our ability to secure our interests.
The fourth quality of agility on my list is visibility. This is a key element, as it exists in all organizations that move quickly, adapt, and share information freely. These organizations allow
for the best authoritative data available to drive decisions. For us in the Navy, this has as much
applicability to a theater of maritime operations as it does to the back office. The proliferation of
platforms with sensors, and our ability to integrate and understand all the data they produce, will
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be critical to the success of the future war-fighting mission. But all this data has to make sense,
and we must figure out how best to exploit visibility to the right level and at the right time so that
we increase both our lethality and our ability to defend ourselves.
The same organizational value of visibility holds true for our business environment—and in this
regard I will put it quite simply: We need to know where all our stuff is, and we need to know
how much it costs, and we need to know how long it is going to take to get it where it needs to be.
Today, I don’t think anyone in our organization can answer those questions with a high degree
of confidence. In the future, however, lots of people in our organization will be required to do
so. This is why the financial audit effort is such a high priority for me, and why it is so critical
to the entire enterprise. The financial audit, despite its name, should never be viewed as solely a
finance-driven effort. Rather, it is an enterprise imperative, because the corrections in visibility,
accountability, and overall enterprise behavior will accrue to our war-fighting mission directly.
The fifth quality of agility is innovation. Agile organizations are adept at and comfortable with
trying new things—with experimenting, failing, measuring, and trying again—all with a view
toward finding new solutions to current and anticipated problems. For those of you who have not
read it, but who have an interest in understanding how the breakthrough innovation of manned
flight happened in the last century, I commend to you the Wright brothers biography written by
David McCullough. The Wright brothers’ story is remarkable. It is great history, but it is also
a pure innovation case study. Even though this occurred over one hundred years ago, Orville
and Wilbur Wright demonstrate that innovation is driven by constant trial and error, meticulous
documentation, and the deliberate construction of a culture of learning. We need a “learning
culture” in the Navy. We must embrace this as a core value. As many of you know, Ex Scientia
Tridens is the motto of the Naval Academy. Those words, roughly translated, mean “Through
Knowledge, Sea Power.” As we think about innovation and its role in the future of our Navy and
Marine Corps, no words seem more relevant than these. While we surely must invest in more
ships, aircraft, submarines, armored vehicles, and new missile systems, nothing will be more important than the investment we make in knowledge—and on creating a force made up of people
who thirst for it. Rapid technological advances are driving the raw technical requirements for this
mandate, but knowledge is not purely defined by technical competence. For knowledge to truly
produce sea power, we must create a culture in the Navy and Marine Corps that is committed to
learning as a lifelong process—and a lifelong passion. Such a culture is not defined merely by
certificates or degrees accumulated at regular career intervals, but rather it encourages innovation
and risk taking and produces sailors and Marines who are prepared to excel in circumstances that
are characterized by uncertainty, and by adversaries who are unpredictable.
This last quality has specific implications for this institution and the other educational institutions
across the Navy, such as the Naval Academy, the Post Graduate School, and the Marine Corps
University. We must break the mold with respect to how we think about the role of education in
the career progressions of our sailors, Marines, and officer corps. In this regard, we are at a point
in history not unlike that which was addressed by Captains Ernest King, Dudley Knox, and Bill
Pye in their seminal report on naval education published in 1920. The report laid the foundation
for the education of naval officers for years to come, with a greater emphasis on developing officers with an understanding of strategy, policy, and national security thinking. It is hard to imag74

ine an agile naval mind that is well prepared for our current turbulent security environment being
able to lead without these characteristics. Therefore, I am commissioning a comprehensive cleansheet review of naval education to determine how well we are educating—not merely training—
our naval forces today, and for the future. While I do not want to presume any conclusions that
may come from this “Knox-King-Pye Redux for the 21st Century,” I suspect some major course
corrections are in order, as they are for most every institution that expects to survive and thrive in
this century. So, as you think about your tasks over these next few days, I ask that you consider
agility and its components and its implications for the future of naval education when you experiment with what may result when you “break the mold.”
I will conclude by citing one of the many memorable quotes of John Paul Jones, because it
relates to why agile minds will matter so much in our future Navy. Jones famously said, “Men
mean more than guns in the rating of a ship.” It loses nothing in the translation when we say,
“People mean more than weapons in the rating of a service.” Jones’s quote recognizes a profound
point of truth that is perhaps even more relevant today than it was over two hundred years ago.
Our maritime advantage is, and will continue to be, almost entirely dependent upon the quality of
our people. It follows, therefore, that the agility of our future force will be almost entirely dependent upon the agility of the people we identify now to lead it. Therefore, I encourage you to think
about breaking the mold in a way that allows us to recruit, train, equip, and educate the most
quick-minded, flexible, collaborative, innovative, and transparent people we can find. If we do
this, we will set the Navy on the course for maritime superiority well into this century.
The future dictates that our maritime forces will have to contend with something agile, and so we
must find and develop people who are agile enough to defeat it, and give them more responsibility. I predict we will have to break the mold to do it, but if we do it will set our Navy, as it sails
into uncertainty, on a course for agility and ultimate victory.
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APPENDIX 2
BREAKING THE MOLD—WAR AND STRATEGY IN THE 21st CENTURY
Precepts to the Participants by Dr. Harlan Ullman
Purposes: This conference is intended to begin discussion, inquiry, and examination of how
“war” may evolve in the coming decades of the 21st century and what strategies might be needed
to anticipate and respond effectively and within likely resource realities. War is broadly defined
to include strategic and theater/tactical nuclear, conventional, unconventional, space, cyber, and
what Russia calls active measures and the United States terms hybrid warfare. Given that this
conference is only for a day and a half, obvious limitations constrain how much can be covered.
But the key words are “breaking the mold” in thinking about the future of war and strategies to
respond and anticipate. The first attachment, on “A Navy the Nation Needs,” is an example of
how much breaking we would like to do, and an issue list and questions to help guide discussion
will be distributed shortly.
The crucial guiding and operative principle is to think boldly and creatively about the future,
with few restraints other than the laws of physics.
This first conference is meant to begin developing a framework for this examination and to raise
critical questions, including “unknowns” about the nature and character of future war, to stimulate and provoke imaginative, even counterintuitive thinking regarding strategic responses; to
strengthen the ability for critical analytical thinking and assessment; to create a range of different possible strategies for dealing with future war in all its forms, with implications for active,
reserve, and guard force structure, composition, and levels; operational requirements and deployments; lethal and nonlethal capabilities; personnel and manning; education and training, especially in light of the new Defense Strategy that argues that current professional military education
is “stagnant”; and the organization of national security and defense staffs at headquarters and
operational levels, including the defense industrial, R&D base; a plan for the regeneration and
reconstitution of forces; and other issues to be raised. It is a beginning.
Assumptions and Scenarios: The following is meant to bound the first conference with certain
assumptions and descriptions of the future that by no means are definitive. While these assumptions and scenarios define a world more unstable and less attractive than today’s, none of the
dangers (except an unanticipated environmental catastrophe) are deemed to be existential threats
to the United States and its allies. We also ask that participants not challenge the assumptions and
scenarios, as some starting point is needed, and the spectrum is potentially so wide that the entire
conference could be spent debating each assumption.
The conference will take a “breaking the mold of conventional thinking” approach in applying
creativity, innovation, and imagination, with the following rules of the game specific for this
conference (which may be altered for future meetings).
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In the world of 202X:
•

No antigravity or other technologically impossible solutions to problems have been invented.

•

No major war has occurred between or among the largest/major powers.

•

Budget appropriations will continue to be (far) less than is required to maintain the current
force structure, strategic and operational requirements, and deployments, especially with the
shift to major-power competition or confrontation as the priorities. Left uncorrected, this will
produce a hollow force and potentially grave problems for preserving the all-volunteer force,
especially in light of greater dependence on minority, LGBQT, and other socially directed
recruiting.

•

Power will continue to diffuse, empowering individuals and nonstate groups at the expense
of traditional states.

•

Serious potential threats will continue to arise from nonmilitary and nonkinetic sources, to
include “active measures”; cyber; creative use of economic and mercantile policies; intimidation; misinformation, propaganda, misdirection, and interference in domestic politics from
external sources; and more innovative use of military power to achieve political objectives,
from classic messaging (e.g., sailing SSNs close to underwater cables and linkages; arms
sales; advisors; and demonstrations of military force, such as firing Kalibr missiles from the
Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean).

•

Offensive, precision weapons and C4ISR will tend to dominate defenses, meaning that deception and maneuver will be more critical. So too, logistical and C4ISR networks likewise
will become more vulnerable.

•

Doctrine of most states with advanced weapons stresses the advantage of firing the first shot,
that is, anticipating an enemy’s actions and striking preemptively. These arguments have been
highly criticized as too provocative, and in part the history of World War I—in light of the
premise of “who mobilizes first, wins”—is used to refute this doctrine.

•

Failure of nuclear arms talks—INF and New Start—and the U.S. withdrawal from the
JCPOA with Iran. But modernization rather than an arms race has led to self-imposed limits
on strategic forces by the United States and Russia. Meanwhile, China has pursued a more
technologically advanced but still minimum nuclear deterrent.

•

Continued erosion in NATO, as certain unnamed but known allies pursue different courses
and BREXIT distances the United Kingdom from Europe.

•

The U.S. political system remains polarized and highly divisive, and growing deficits, along
with interest rate increases, represent a major, possibly crippling, constraint for the military
forces.

•

No global financial or environmental catastrophe has occurred.
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In general terms, the world of 202X is one marked by the continued diffusion of power and globalization. Qualitatively, the military forces of the United States and several NATO and Asian allies, Russia, and China have become relatively equal in advanced capability, but with significant
strategic distinctions. Russian forces remain centered on Europe and protection of Russia, with
small but effective deployments abroad. China’s military remains a high-low mix, with many
PLA units less well-equipped than others, owing to financial constraints.
The major difference is that nonstate groups and individuals have acquired significant cyber and
other electronic capabilities, including limited EMP weapons. Meanwhile, India has modernized
its forces. Pakistan has become more radicalized. The U.S. presence in Afghanistan has been
minimal and largely antiterrorist-oriented, as power has moved out of Kabul and a ceasefire with
the Taliban has been in existence for several years.
The Gulf and Middle East remain turbulent. Saudi Arabia has experienced several incidents of
major violence; Plan 2030 never achieved its objectives. The Saudi-Israeli detente ended when
Israel renounced a two-state solution. The Gulf Cooperative Council finally expelled Qatar,
which moved closer to Iran, whose influence in the region increased. With American withdrawal
from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the embargoes on Iran were fully lifted
in exchange for continued compliance by the other signatories, increasing the schism between
Washington and those other JCPOA signatories. While Washington fumed, it had little effect.
Iran continued to increase its influence in Iraq and signed a joint security treaty with Baghdad.
The Islamic State and other jihadi groups continued to make attacks in the region and gained
more than footholds in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Indonesia, several African states, and the Philippines. Much of this activity was based on criminal activities to raise as much money as possible,
largely through Internet scams and thefts.
NATO finally expelled one member that threatened to leave after claiming NATO no longer considered it an ally. Other members maintained right-wing governments, and some reduced their
participation, favoring greater cooperation with Russia.
In the United States, continued growth in deficits and debt forced major cuts in defense and
national security spending. The active duty force had been cut to under one million, with only
a selected number of units being deemed fully operationally ready. The economy did not grow
quickly enough to match the growing debt. As a result, the overall standard of living declined
and the disparity between rich and poor grew larger. The two political parties remained dominated by more-extreme left- and right-wing positions, and neither party was able to control both
ends of Pennsylvania Avenue such that one party could govern with a veto-proof majority.
Social media continued to have significant psychological effects on Americans and American
politics. Ironically, while the under-thirty generation maintained vast social networks, interpersonal relations remained relatively minor. Political correctness continued to have an impact on
society and the military. Recruitment became more difficult as fewer Americans wished to serve
in uniform. Many who joined did so for specialist assignments such as cyber and AI, while a significant minority of those recruited had social, psychological, and personality characteristics that
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hindered the application of traditional forms of discipline and the exercise of the strict chain of
command essential to a functioning military. This required major changes within the department
that continued to demand constant attention, with the media and Congress seizing on incidents of
maltreatment of minorities.
Key Questions and Issues: First, because the 21st century is profoundly different from the 20th,
how applicable are the critical terms and concepts from the 20th century, such as deterrence, containment, suasion, assured destruction, flexible response, and global wars on terror?
The 20th century was largely binary: Allies versus Central powers in World War I, Allies versus
the Axis in World War II, East versus West, and capitalism versus communism. The world now is
far more complex, interconnected, and interrelated. How then is war changing, if at all, considering this massive diffusion of power and a relative equalization of advanced military technology
in which the United States no longer maintains superiority?
During the Cold War, military deterrence equaled political deterrence between East and West.
But in the 21st century, military deterrence alone does not equal political deterrence. How then
does the best Army, Navy, and Air Force in the world defeat adversaries who lack those forces,
and who instead rely on an idea and terror to advance their interests?
How, if at all, can Russian “active measures,” China’s mercantile strategy of expanding into the
China Seas, cyber, global jihad, and failed and failing governments that are the major dangers to
mankind be deterred by military force alone, or at least as the predominant response?
While nuclear proliferation has so far been constrained, what strategic nuclear strategies may be
appropriate, including a minimum deterrent matched by stronger defenses against nuclear attack
or threat?
How will the political need for “immaculate war” and minimization of all casualties—not only
on our side, but with regard to collateral damage and even our enemies—affect war, strategy, and
the uses of force?
To what degree can autonomous systems and advanced AI compensate for humans, and what are
the implications for legal, moral, operational, and rules-of-engagement considerations?
Finally, how does war in the 21st century affect how we train, recruit, maintain, and educate the
military to keep pace with this rapid and continuing change?
What is needed is a strategic and operational concept or set of concepts that takes into account
these profound differences between past and current realities. A “brains-based approach” to
sound strategic thinking is one option and is expanded upon below. Redefining deterrence, containment, and the 20th century tool kit is another. How might this be accomplished?
Second, nonkinetic aspects of warfare may be as important in affecting will and perception as is
military force. The military does not have full responsibility and authority for responding to these
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challenges. While the whole-of-government approach is highly touted as a solution, it is, in fact,
more rhetoric than reality. For example, who is in charge of cyber in the U.S. government?
Russian trolls and bots have made powerful inroads into domestic societies, in some cases shaping opinion. The same incursions must be expected into military domains. How do we respond,
for example when the Internet is full of false information and disinformation that impugns the
U.S. military with stories of misconduct, incompetence, and unsatisfactory performance?
Third, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work called for a “Third Offset” strategy,
largely but not entirely to protect the network and our dependence on connectivity. This offset
must be expanded in a strategic context. Here, a “porcupine defense” in dealing with Russia is
one such option, and is defined below. Another is the notion of a strategy to contain potential
Chinese military expansion within the first island chain, with the provocative name of “a mobile
maritime Maginot Line that cannot be outflanked” (realizing that the Maginot Line was never
breached frontally); this concept is also defined below.
A further option, put forward by Admiral James Stavridis, USN (Ret.), now dean of the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts, calls for greater reliance on special forces, cyber, and
UVs, all broadly defined. How might this be implemented?
A last option is a strategy based on redefining the National Security Act and Unified Command
Plan, along with reconstitution and regeneration of forces in which a smaller but highly ready
active-duty force would be dependent on a larger reserve or cadre component that could be mobilized when needed. What might these strategic options entail; what basic assumptions would
undergird each; what would be the strengths and weaknesses; how would the entire defense and
manpower base support each; and would each be affordable, given the reality of the resources
available?
Finally, in all our thinking, we should consider how to turn adversarial strengths to weaknesses
and our weaknesses into strengths. Winning or exploiting the cost-exchange ratio is one means to
accomplish these reversals. The United States so far has spent about $70 billion on counter-IEDs;
the enemy virtually spent pennies on the IEDs themselves. The same sort of cost-exchange ratio
applies when we drop Mk 82 iron bombs on terrorists from an F-35 that costs $65,000 an hour
to operate. How do we force potential adversaries into similar disadvantages without resorting to
huge expenditures on our side, such as that for SDI—which did not bankrupt the Soviet Union?
For example, if a future Russian operational maneuver group (OMG) is organized along lines
similar to today’s, it has at least three major vulnerabilities. First, as the North Vietnamese
learned from the battle of Ia Drang in 1965, “hugging the belt” can defeat U.S. firepower superiority (or its Russian OMG equivalent) by bringing the enemy into such proximity that friendly
fire poses as much danger to own forces as to the enemy’s. Second, OMGs are hugely dependent
on lines of supply and logistics. How can these be cut or interrupted? Third, as with our formations, OMGs are dependent on networks and command and control systems that often restrict the
exercise of initiative on the part of local commanders. These vulnerabilities and others must be
understood and exploited.
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The same approach is true for the PLA operating inside the first island chain. While the PLA may
actually have a porcupine defense of its own for the littorals (and as far out as its DF-21 missiles
can strike), beyond that perimeter it is vulnerable. This provides the basis for a strategy of denial
and containment, as noted both above and below.
Similarly, what additional techniques can be used to take on Islamist radicalism? Kinetic strikes
have downsides in terms of collateral damage and inciting others to join the cause for reasons
stemming from revenge, anger, or desperation. This is an area ripe for further investigation.
Finally, how can we reverse the cost-exchange ratio vis-à-vis “active measures”? It may well
be that in the future active measures will be part of the playbook of all adversaries, from states
to nonstate groups to individuals. While this may not be primarily an issue for DoD to address,
DoD does have the resources to play a vital role.
In summary, the diffusion of technology means that a number of states and nonstate groups have
military capabilities at least comparable to those of the United States. The continuing assumption
of technological superiority no longer applies, at least with regard to many capabilities. Capabilities for long-range precision strike and the close-in fight, including C4ISR and weapons systems,
are no longer dominated by the United States and its allies, although in the aggregate NATO and
non-NATO major allies still maintain the largest forces. However, particularly in AI, China has
taken the lead.
The conclusion is that no longer can the United States spend its way clear of danger. It must
think its way out of harm’s way. Hence, a brains-based approach, or something akin to it, is vital.
A Brains-Based Approach to Strategic Thinking: Like Gaul, this concept consists of three
parts. First, it must recognize that the 21st century is profoundly different from the 20th. The
world is far more interconnected and interrelated. What happens in one region may, and probably
will, have profound effects globally. Further, while the 20th century was largely binary in terms
of war and adversaries (Allies versus Central Powers in World War I, Allies versus Axis in World
War II, East versus West in the Cold War), today is far more complicated. And the tools and concepts of the 20th century—such as deterrence, containment, and suasion, for example—do not fit
in the 21st and must be updated.
For example, what does it take to “deter” Russian active measures, China’s mercantilism, and
the danger of radical Islam? And beyond that, virtually all of the international structures in play
today—from NATO to the UN, the World Bank, and the G-7—are constructs of the last century.
Second, a brains-based approach must be knowledge-based, to allow and facilitate as complete
an understanding as possible when determining policy, including whether and when to use force.
That knowledge must range from the basic aims to an intimate analysis of the adversary; the
various possible courses of action and the assumptions underlying each; and their consequences,
including their resource implications, their costs, and an objective calculation of their affordability in blood and treasure.
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Third, the aim of a brains-based approach to strategic thinking must be to affect, influence, and
control the will and perception of the other so as to allow our brains to beat their brains, in part
by greater innovation, ingenuity, and inventiveness—often called out-of-the-box thinking.
Strategic Options and Scenarios: Against the future described above, three broad strategic options will be used to focus responses to “war” in the 21st century, and of course on breaking the
mold of “conventional” thinking. The first strategy is a “porcupine defense,” undertaken in part
in conjunction with Naval Forces Europe and focused on Europe and Russia. The assumption
here is that Russia has no interest in attacking NATO directly. Instead, Russia will rely on a combination of military threat, using its modernized conventional forces and its superiority in theater
and tactical nuclear weapons; “active measures”; political intimidation and interference; and
economic leverage in energy, including by seeking substantial ownership and control of western
energy companies through legal business activities.
NATO’s response has been to increase rotational forces’ presence and training exercises, and to
establish two new commands intended to ensure better awareness of and response to Russian
actions. Further, NATO has moved to increase its cyber and counter-information capacity. Promises to increase defense spending have been made; however, it is unrealistic to believe that many
states will reach 2 percent of GDP spending for defense. And Russia will continue to attempt to
exploit cleavages within the alliance arising over Brexit, questions of actual long-term U.S. commitment, and a shift of domestic politics rightward in several member states.
The porcupine strategy and defense are built on the concept of making any attempted Russian
incursion west—however unlikely that scenario may be—extremely costly, while also countering Russian “active measures.” Indeed, this line of defense is not unlike the fortification of
Kaliningrad through antiaccess/area denial measures, but using far more unconventional and
less expensive means.
The Black Sea will provide the test cases for a porcupine defense strategy. Using Romania as a
specific example, this form of defense would seek to deploy hundreds, if not thousands, of UVs
across the land, sea, subsurface, and air domains; their purposes would range from providing
C4ISR, to targeting and destroying, to providing deception and misdirection, to harassing any
invading troops. The use of underwater UVs to carry antiship and antisubmarine missiles and
torpedoes that could be predeployed is part of this approach. Long-range strike missiles would be
deployed as well.
Ashore, protection of Aegis ashore and air defenses would be enhanced, as Romania has also
bought Patriot. And Constanta, the major seaport, would be expanded in terms of its defenses,
including the reinforcement of the marine battalion stationed nearby.
Ground forces would be organized into guerrilla-type forces that would be designed to attack
the logistics and supply lines of any potential attacker, realizing that any likely incursion from
the east was likely to be sea-based, given the geography and presence of Ukraine as a natural
land barrier. Infrastructure would be improved to allow reception of deployable air forces and
other units from allies in times of crisis. And of course, countering active measures is central.
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Participants will be asked to expand on these concepts and ideas.
Despite the unfortunate associations of the name (and noting that the Maginot Line in fact was
never breached, but was outflanked), a mobile maritime Maginot Line that cannot be outflanked
will provide the second scenario in Asia. The strategy is based on the concept of containing
Chinese military expansion to inside the first island chain, using a range of UAVs in all domains,
with emphasis on submersibles that can be predeployed well in advance, armed with antiship,
-air, and -submarine weapons. The use of decoys, deception, and misdirection would be extensive. Strike groups would function as a reserve, keeping out the range of China’s DF-21s.
Greater reliance on special forces, cyber, and UAVs will mark the third strategy—which needs
no further elaboration.
And the final strategy will look at restructuring the foundation for national security, namely the
National Security Act and the Unified Command Plan, with a comprehensive approach across
government that includes examining how strategies of regeneration and reconstitution might be
utilized.
Organization: Four seminars will cover the scenarios noted above. Each will be led by two
co-chairmen and a rapporteur, whose function will be to identify the most crucial and important points, observations, and, where appropriate, conclusions, along with any implications for
“un-stagnating military education.”
Seminar One: Breaking the Mold: A Porcupine Strategy of Defense in Europe
• In this seminar, Romania will be the test case for developing this strategy.
Seminar Two: Breaking the Mold: A Mobile, Maritime Maginot Line in Asia
Seminar Three: Breaking the Mold: Reliance on Special Forces, UAVs, and Cyber
Seminar Four: Breaking the Mold: Reorganizing for National Security
• This seminar will consider the drafting of a new national security act and national security
organization, to include all branches of government, along with changing the structure of
the Unified Command Plan and the five-sided organization of the Pentagon (SecDef; OSD;
defense agencies; the CJCS, JCS, and Joint Staff; and the service secretaries and chiefs.
Handouts on each of the seminars will be distributed well in advance of the conference.
Homework: We ask each participant to bring at least one idea, concept, or hypothesis about
future war and strategy to the conference and, if possible, to submit it in advance, along with at
least one crucial question that can help shape our thinking. We also would appreciate it if each
participant would read the rules of the road noted above carefully so that we do not spend much
time in a prebrief. After that, this will be a no-holds-barred discussion on war and strategy in the
21st century.
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Notes for Seminars
Background Issues and Questions for Each Group: These can be discussed separately or concurrently, but should be fully considered. Groups are free to add to or expand on this list, which
is not meant to be fully comprehensive, but merely to provoke further discussion. And the operative word is “provoke.” We really want to break the mold. We ask, however, that you read the
background paper first.
What are your best guesses as to how the nature or character of war is likely to change, if at
all, in the coming decades, and what does this mean for strategy and strategic alternatives?
•

Do 20th-century concepts such as deterrence and defense apply to the 21st century? What
does it take to deter Russia or China or North Korea or Iran, not only from war and conflict
but to contain their geopolitical and economic aspirations and “active measures”? If war
comes, is it even possible to defeat Russia or China, and if so what does it take?

•

As technology becomes more fungible and available, will the diffusion of power across the
board offer far greater military capability to smaller states and nonstate actors? Does Moore’s
Law apply beyond zeroes and ones, greatly reducing the technological lead of the United
States and its NATO and other allies? Or can the United States and the West maintain their
technological advantage and superiority?

•

Will future defenses overpower offenses in terms of creating more favorable cost-exchange
ratios, or will the offense give more credence to preemption?

•

Will the real increases in the costs of people and advanced weapons systems lead to smaller
militaries, but will they benefit from reduced costs for low-earth satellites and breakthroughs
in other technology areas?

•

Will the greatest leverage in war reside in advances in knowledge and understanding of battle
and conflict conditions, somewhat removing the fog and friction—the Bill Owens aspiration?

•

Will deception, misinformation, and misdirection become areas for the greatest improvements in lethality and military advantage, as “active measures” become more widespread
across more militaries?

•

Will future wars likely be longer or shorter, and will they be subject to escalation or limitation?

•

Will fewer bigger or more smaller platforms and systems dominate force planning, and how
will the distribution of capability and capacity across all forces—sea, air, special, space, and
cyber—likely evolve?

•

Will the “narrative” gain greater strategic and political value in war and conflict, so much so
that the “battle of the narrative” dominates outcomes?

•

Will the aversion to casualties, collateral as well as military, become a more important factor?

•

Will allies and publics be persuaded to support such changes?
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•

What may be the reactions and responses of potential adversaries to U.S. strategic changes?

•

What does this mean for strategy and strategic options, and for the roles of naval power
specifically?

•

What does this mean for organizing for national security; the UCP; the so-called comprehensive approach across government; and NATO? What might be a more effective organization?
How might Congress be more intimately engaged? Does intelligence need yet another reorganization?

•

What are the biggest unknowns and the biggest ideas, as takeaways?

•

What conclusions does this lead to for naval education, given that the Under Secretary is
launching a “clean sheet” review of these assets?

Seminar 1: A Porcupine Defense
The porcupine defense is based on three assumptions: first, the geography of the Black Sea and
the Dardanelles; second, the ability of local states, supported by NATO, to bloody badly and
halt potential aggression and attack, including in the form of active measures; and third, that
reinforcement and the threat of escalation from NATO provide further deterrent and reassurance
value. In essence, this is a variant of the so-called antiaccess/area-denial concept, using a more
active defense that must include counters to active measures, information and electronic warfare,
subversion, “little green men,” and intimidation.
If Kaliningrad is included as part of Russia, only six NATO states border on or are proximate
to Russian territory: the three Baltic states; Poland; Norway, at its northern tip; and the United
States, by way of the tip of Alaska’s Aleutian Islands. In the Black Sea, any Russian military
action against NATO states—Romania, Turkey, and Bulgaria—must come through Ukraine,
Georgia, or Azerbaijan, or by sea and air.
This strategy discussion will focus on Romania and the fortifying of its position on the Black
Sea, centered on Constanta, along with other NATO assets in the region and country. The strategy will concentrate on Russian land, air, and naval weaknesses and strengths; those of both
the operational maneuver group and active measures; using largely Romanian forces, supported with C4ISR in support of NATO forces. It will concentrate heavily on the extensive use of
perhaps thousands of unmanned systems; longer-range cruise and other missiles; thousands of
antivehicle and air munitions, such as Javelins and Stingers; local GPS and less jammable C4I;
inexpensive, low-earth-orbit satellites; local partisan or guerrilla-like forces; and mobile land/
air quick-response units. The Russian order of battle (OOB) can be taken from the Military Balance and updated to reflect some time in the future, but with no revolutionary changes.
Constanta will be reinforced with these systems, in conjunction with M-K Aegis ashore and Patriot batteries, the new logistic air base, and the NATO multinational brigade HQ at Craiova, with
a series of concentric defenses that can reach at least 200 miles into the Black Sea. If Russia were
to mount a land assault, it would have to do so by invading west through Ukraine, which would
be costly and time-consuming, given the likelihood of Ukrainian resistance.
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While military options are configured using the above criteria, a broader geopolitical strategy of
using NATO forces in support is needed, with a time frame of one to two years to develop and
field the required capabilities, to include the new logistics command. Strategic use of Turkey and
Bulgaria also must be considered, including possible revision of the 1936 Montreux Convention—one can argue that the convention is obsolete, given that many of the original signatories
are gone (such as the Soviet Union, although Russia claims sovereign continuity) and Georgia
and Ukraine are new Black Sea states.
Seminar 2: A Mobile Maritime Maginot Line in Asia
First, people will object to a reference to the Maginot Line. But the Maginot Line was never
breached; it was outflanked. This approach will not suffer from that weakness, as the line of
defense will extend from the Aleutians to Vietnam.
The basic assumptions are, first, geographical; second, a greater dependence on regional states
and allies; and third, confining Chinese military expansion to the first island chain. Elsewhere,
this has been called the Archipelago Defense. This strategy turns Japan, South Korea, Taiwan,
the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia into potential large aircraft carriers and fortresses,—the
linchpins and foundations for a mobile maritime defense.
To what degree can we fashion a new form of containment strategy using allies and potential
partners such as Vietnam to put in place air, sea, land, and electronic barriers to a Chinese breakout? Clearly, the Philippines are an interesting challenge, given the personality of its president.
Similarly, making greater strategic use of Indonesia poses parallel challenges.
Such a strategy obviously would entail naval and shore-based elements, to include long-range
missiles, air defenses, and mine capability, and likely would require potential deployments of
land-based forces to augment local and regional defenses.
The overarching policy would be a variant of the old Nixon Doctrine. The United States would
provide the strategic capability, assisting and supporting regional states, onto whom more-local
security responsibilities would shift.
Seminar 3: A New Triad—Greater Reliance on Unmanned Systems, Special Forces, and
Cyber, Writ Large
Assume that the United States maintains the ability to deploy forces (including deployed joint
forces) of about 100,000–150,000 on each coast, to cover two contingencies; and the strategic
nuclear balance is maintained. This strategy would place far more emphasis on special forces,
increasing their numbers from a total of 82,000 uniformed and civilian personnel to a larger figure, in part by making regular forces more “special.” The purpose of this emphasis would be to
provide more capability to conduct counterterror, training-and-assistance, and other missions not
requiring heavier forces.
Far more reliance would be placed on unmanned systems. Likewise, cyber as well as informational and electronic-warfare roles would be allocated substantial resources of people and money,
particularly to counter “active measures.”
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What would be the strategy for this emphasis; what would it say about future war; and what roles
and missions would it fill?
Seminar 4: Revising the Organization for National Defense
National defense is organized around the 1947 act, as amended, and of course other major legislation, including annual authorization and appropriation laws that have imposed changes on the
overall organization. However, clearly, the overall organization is huge, redundant, and overlapping; usually too slow in making decisions, and often incapable of providing necessary knowledge and intelligence in a timely fashion; and ill-prepared to cope with the challenges of cyber,
active measures, and other issues.
It is interesting that the key national security bureaucracies—those of DoD, State, the NSC, the
DCI, CIA, Congress, Homeland Security, Justice, and the Treasury—have no common regional
or functional organizations, meaning that there is large overlap. The Unified Command Plan still
reflects much of the Cold War mind-set, and the presence of multiple jurisdictions—Africa, for
example. The problems resulting from these aspects normally are rectified by virtue of particular
personalities and command relationships—which are not necessarily permanent.
The Pentagon itself has as more key parts than it has sides: the Secretary of Defense and OSD;
the Chairman, Joint Chiefs, and Joint Staff; the service secretaries and their staffs; combatant
commands; and defense agencies. Does this organization require major change?
Defense acquisition, despite countless commissions, reviews, and studies, remains too slow,
bureaucratic, expensive, and cumbersome, and incapable of bringing needed capabilities into
service on a timely basis.
Assuming we are starting from a clean sheet, and including the necessary players and organizations as inputs, what might constitute a new national security act and national security organization, including the organization of Congress? With Armed Services Committees and a plethora
of subcommittees and divided jurisdiction over intelligence, money, budgets, homeland security,
and the like, can anything be done to rationalize this organization?
Finally, what is the strategy for advancing the need for reorganization? Obviously, the narrative
and means to convince, cajole, or coerce support is vital. The focus must be on DoD and combatant commands; however, understanding the broader makeup of national security is essential to
any reorganization.
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Attachment 1: Action Plan for a Navy the Nation Needs
Subj: Crash Action Plan for a Navy the Nation Needs
If we are serious about pursuing a more lethal Navy, we need to break the mold of past thinking
because under those conditions, without a huge and virtually impossible increase in budgets, that
goal is not achievable, certainly for decades. This means that both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue
must be given options that extend well beyond the bounds of conventional and traditional thinking. If these turn out to politically a bridge too far, then decision makers know that this goal will
be just that.
Here are a range of options that “break the mold:”
•

First, change our maritime strategies and deployments/requirements to include a porcupine
defense in Europe and a mobile flexible Maginot Line plan in Asia, with clear force-level
consequences.

•

Examine the need for opposed-entry amphibious operations, to create options.

•

Shift to a truly high-low mix for ships and aircraft:
—more, smaller “hunter-killer” combatants of 1000 tons or less; diesel-electric
—submarines for both SS and SSB; Corsair III tactical aircraft
—CVLs/sea-control ships with 15–20 F-35s
—far more UAVs of all classes
—lighter-than-air ships/blimps

•

Buying foreign hulls and using commercial standards, using U.S. weapons and electronics
systems.

•

Relying more on a strategy of reconstitution and regeneration of forces to reduce costs, to
include placing certain large combatants and even SSNs in a “cadre” status, to be recalled
when needed—saving ONM costs.

•

Placing more reliance on allies and the 1000 ship navy or maritime partnerships to compensate for and complement U.S. needs.

•

Placing more reliance on cover, deception, and new ways of doing operational business, such
as carrier battle decoy groups and other means of deception.

•

Having a better narrative. If forming Task Force 355 to emphasize the commitment to growing the Navy cannot be done, elevate this goal to the highest levels of the Navy and Marine
Corps.

•

Inducing a revolution in naval education to ensure that the naval service is well prepared
intellectually, strategically, and operationally for the future.
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APPENDIX 3
“Breaking the Mold” Workshop—Point Papers

“Adopting Swarming USV Operations in European Waters: The Jeune Ecole (‘the Young
School’) Meets the 21st Century,” by Dr. Richard Moss
“A Flotilla to Support a Strategy of Offshore Control,” by Dean Emeritus Wayne Hughes and
Professor of Practice Jeff Kline
“Seabed Warfare and the Evaporation of Submarine Stealth,” by Professor Bill Glenney
“Amphibious Warships in the Sea Control Battle,” by Dr. Sam Tangredi
“Adding Sea-Based Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) to the U.S. Navy Future
Fleet,” by Dr. Sam Tangredi
“Shifting From Sea Control to Ocean/Global Commons Control: Preventing PRC Global Maritime Operations,” by Dr. Sam Tangredi
“Utilizing a Prototype Mobile Offshore Base (MOB) to Reestablish Global Norms in the South
China Sea,” by Dr. Sam Tangredi
“Transcendent Wars of the 21st Century,” by Dr. Lewis M. Duncan, Provost
“Employing Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Naval Warfare (Not Naval Weapons),” by CAPT Adam
Aycock
“The Big Idea: Modern Multi-Mission Airships,” by Professor John Jackson
“The Future Force: Blue Hair in the Gray Zone,” by Dr. Jacquelyn Schneider
“Rethinking Forward Presence and Forward Defense,” by Dr. Peter Dombrowski
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POINT PAPER

Dr. Richard Moss
Russia Maritime Studies Institute/SORD/CNWS/NWC
richard.moss@usnwc.edu
26 February 2018

ADOPTING SWARMING USVs OPERATIONS IN EUROPEAN WATERS:
JEUNE ECOLE (“THE YOUNG SCHOOL”) MEETS THE 21st CENTURY
BACKGROUND
•

With its layered-defense umbrella of surface-to-air missiles, lethal anti-ship cruise missiles
(ASCMs), and precision long-range strike, Russia is positioned to deny air and sea lines of
communication to the US Navy and its allies across the Black and Baltic Seas.

•

Simply put, the United States and its NATO allies occupy the weaker position vis-à-vis Russia
in these waters, and it is time to adopt an approach that recognizes this reality. History may
provide some insights.

DISCUSSION
•

French Vice Admiral Hyacinthe-Laurent-Theophile Aube, one of the fathers of
late-nineteenth-century France’s Jeune Ecole—the Young School—recognized France’s relative economic and military weakness vis-à-vis Great Britain. Instead of matching Great Britain ship class to ship class (i.e., battleship to battleship) and in tonnage, Aube advocated the
use of emerging technologies, clever tactics, and a large fleet of smaller ships, such as torpedo
boats, to beat a stronger adversary. Although France never got to test Aube’s ideas out against
Great Britain, the ideas of the Young School still resonate in asymmetric situations.

•

While Iran is not usually seen as a model for emulation, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards
Corps Navy’s (IRGCN’s) concept of swarming large, multi-mission ships with heavily armed
watercraft in constricted waterways is worth considering. It would be unwise to ignore the
real threat that the IRGCN’s arming its small craft with anti-ship cruise missiles, torpedoes,
rockets and heavy machine guns presents.

•

Imperial Japan’s kamikaze planes (and boats) during World War Two, the explosive-laden
suicide boat attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000, and a Houthi suicide-boat attack on a Saudi
ship off the coast of Yemen in 2017 demonstrate how a weaker, desperate attacker can impose
serious costs on a stronger opponent. In addition to killing 17 sailors and wounding 39 more,
the attack on the Cole disabled the ship and cost $250 million to bring back to service (and
upgrade).

•

Rather than having NATO forces conduct suicide attacks during conflict, perhaps the application of Yankee ingenuity and technology can play off the old theme. The Israel Aerospace Industry’s Harpy drone—also known as a loitering munition—provides an example of current
technologies, albeit applied to aircraft. The Harpy’s small size and low radar signature make it
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difficult for air defense networks to detect and target. It is versatile and can be launched from
ground or air, and can operate autonomously or with a human in the loop.
•

Swarms of small, fast, inexpensive, and stealthy robotic boats/unmanned surface vehicles
(USVs) armed with ASCMs, torpedoes—or themselves the weapon, kamikaze style—could
tie down an adversary’s larger ships and drain their resources.

•

Numerous automated boat platforms already exist in the U.S. and NATO defense industries.
Anticipating a GPS-denied environment, systems could operate autonomously and rely on
stellar, inertial, electro-optical, or infrared sensors, or some combination thereof.

•

The boats could be stealthy by minimizing height above the waterline, running the exhaust
underwater, and having a diminutive footprint by omitting accommodations for human operators. Likewise, the boats could be constructed with low-radar-cross-section fiberglass and
high-powered commercial-off-the-shelf motors like Latin American “Picuda” (Caribbean
Spanish for “barracuda”) drug runners.

•

The question is not whether the US and/or its allies should adopt such procedures, but rather
what would provide a balance between regular, peacetime operations (like presence missions)
and the use of such systems in wartime.

RECOMMENDATION
•

Instead of encouraging NATO partners, like Romania, to try to match Russia, perhaps the
United States should take a page from Aube’s playbook and encourage allies to think about
larger numbers of inexpensive—but stealthy and extremely lethal—small craft. Likewise, US
NATO allies may look to tactics and platforms weaker opponents have adopted against stronger adversaries.

Sources:
Martin Murphy and Toshi Yoshihara, “Fighting the Naval Hegemon: Evolution in French, Soviet, and Chinese Naval Thought,” Naval War College Review 68, no. 3 (Summer 2015), https://
usnwc2.usnwc.edu/getattachment/27c3fc57-01da-4b12-a360-d3e32a27393c/Fighting-the-Naval
-Hegemon--Evolution-in-French,-S.aspx
Office of Naval Intelligence, “Iranian Naval Forces: A Tale of Two Navies,” February 2017, http://
www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/iran/Iran%20022217SP.pdf
Anthony H. Cordesman and Abdullah Toukan, “Iran and the Gulf Military Balance” (working
draft), CSIS, October 3, 2016, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/161004
_Iran_Gulf_Military_Balance.pdf
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Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Video Emerges of Suicide Boat Ramming Saudi Frigate,” Washington
Post, February 6, 2017; https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/02/06/video
-emerges-of-suicide-boat-ramming- saudi-frigate/?utm_term=.679774a55614
Jeremy Vaughan and Simon Henderson, “Bab al-Mandab Shipping Chokepoint Under Threat,”
POLICYWATCH 2769, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 1, 2017, http://www
.washingtoninstitute.org/policy- analysis/view/bab-al-mandab-shipping-chokepoint-under-threat
Chief Journalist David Nagle, “USS Cole Rejoins the Fleet,” Naval Sea Systems Command Public
Affairs, April 19, 2002, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=1415
“Harpy Air Defense Suppression System,” Defense Update, March 4, 2006, http://defense
-update.com/directory/harpy.htm
Kieran Corcoran, “Drug Cartels Using New ‘Go-Fast’ Boats That Are Almost INVISIBLE To
Radar on Central American Smuggling Missions,” Daily Mail, January 16, 2016, http://www
.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2913854/Drug-cartels-using- new-fast-boats-INVISIBLE
-radar-Central-American-smuggling-missions.html
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POINT PAPER

Dean Emeritus Wayne Hughes, CAPT, USN (Ret.), Naval Postgraduate School, whughes@nps.edu
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A FLOTILLA TO SUPPORT A STRATEGY OF OFFSHORE CONTROL
BACKGROUND
Written by Hughes and Kline under the auspices of OSD Office of Net Assessment in 2012, A
Flotilla to Support a Strategy of Offshore Control proposes an affordable way to increase the
fleet’s offensive capacity and resilience in the littorals. The report draws on NPS student theses,
faculty research in the NPS Littoral Operations Center, and outcomes of ten years of Joint Campaign Analysis capstone work. This paper summarizes the report.

DISCUSSION
•

A flotilla of small missile corvettes should be a low cost, high reward component of the
U.S. fleet. It can be designed to be effective in littoral waters and cul de sacs around the world
in times of cooperation, competition, confrontation, or regional conflict. Squadrons from the
flotilla can support friends and constrain prospective enemies.

•

Squadron tactics should be quickly developed, including experiments with mannedunmanned systems operating cooperatively.

•

Ships of the flotilla can be deployable in numbers appropriate to existing but often-changing
geopolitical conditions anywhere but not everywhere. In other words, the flotilla offers much
greater adaptability than the existing but shrinking fleet of large, expensive, multipurpose
warships. It is designed to relieve the big-ship component of some littoral responsibilities and
supplement their capabilities.

•

The flotilla component can be built with less than 5% of the SCN budget and, because of low
manning and maintenance costs, will be easier to maintain forward base than the big ship
fleet.

•

The missile corvettes do not carry expensive defensive missile systems or aircraft, They survive by point defense, soft kill, stealth, concealment along coastlines, and by blending into
coastal shipping and fishing boats.

•

The feasibility of logistics support, sea worthiness, and deployability has been demonstrated
in detail but must be tailored to local conditions, region by region.

•

As a rough estimate, an affordable flotilla might comprise 64 vessels.

•

Detailed ship designs made by Total Ship System Engineering classes at NPS that match different classes of similar vessels in the world’s navies indicate the following characteristics:
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•

About 500 tons, costing less than $80 million to construct in series production, with a 15-year
service life so that new designs can be quickly built to respond to technology advances.

•

An affordable monohull with little or no expenditures for stealth properties will result in corvettes with about 30 knots speed and shallow draft.

•

Armament is eight Harpoon-sized ASCMs, 24 or more short-range dual-purpose missiles, and
a 57 mm rapid-fire gun.

•

The combat crew is 12 for short-durations offensive strikes, but there are 25 berths for extended peacetime cruising.

•

When a ship is put out of action by a missile, the crew does not do damage control but is
swiftly taken off by a consort vessel while the damaged ship sinks.

•

A strategy of offshore control conducted by squadrons of the flotilla envisions participation
by Marine and Special Force elements along with search by aerial unmanned vehicles tailored
for scouting, tracking, and targeting. The result can be offensively oriented air-sea- ground
task groups deployed at low cost for deterrence, distributable attacks, and survivability in
dangerous waters.

•

The flotilla’s contribution to the U. S. fleet include greater offensive capability, capacity, and
coverage, greater resilience in contested waters, and more diversified engagement flexibility.

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS
•

A flotilla-size vessel provides the opportunity for early command, and to hone leadership and
seamanship skills at an earlier rank.

•

The flotilla provides a venue for manned-unmanned teaming of MDUSV, LDUSV, and
manned ships experimentation and operation

•

A flotilla offers the opportunity for bi-lateral manning and/or exercises with close allies who
may also base the ships
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SEABED WARFARE AND THE EVAPORATION OF
SUBMARINE STEALTH
BACKGROUND
•

World energy markets will be driven to the seabed to drill on smaller and smaller oil fields,
and to harvest the vast methane hydrate supplies.

•

Supplies of readily accessible and refinable rare earth materials on land are consumed, and
China exerts greater control over their supplies driving industry and commercial entities to
the seabed.

•

International regimes for handling seabed activities, such as the United Nations’ International
Seabed Authority, will be only marginally effective. Vast areas of the seabed will become
feral.

•

The Blue Economy will be driven by undersea cables, seabed infrastructure, fish and other
natural resources, and power generation and transmission

•

The Chinese will complete their nearly impenetrable “Undersea Great Wall” encompassing
the entire ECS and SCS, and most of the SOJ and PHILSEA.

•

The proliferation of commercially-developed seabed monitoring systems, ROVs and UUVs
means anybody who wants to monitor the seabed can do so at reasonable cost. Every seabed
commercial venture will patrol and protect their facilities.

•

Every seabed and undersea system will be enabled by robust connectivity, mostly undersea
and virtually undetectable, and strong artificial intelligence and machine learning ensembles.

•

Much of the ocean, and particularly areas of significant commercial investment and value will
have seabed systems that can detect large, manned submarines, and even much smaller ROVs
or UUVs.

•

In short, the sea, especially the seabed, will become significantly more important to the health
of the global economy and more important to the perceived strength of global actors, not just
nation-states. U.S. undersea dominance will be a thing of the past.

•

These changes will impact the U.S. ability to use and own the undersea. The SSN(X) and
COLUMBIA SSBN will be of marginal tactical and strategic value, respectively, as most areas
of interest of the world’s oceans will have become “informationally transparent” while remaining “optically opaque”.
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DISCUSSION
•

Historically, the U.S. Navy has operated under the assumption that “playing the away
game”—being forward deployed—was sufficient to protect and defend U.S. home waters.
Regardless of the status of the “away game,” the U.S. Navy had to also “play the home
game” including the home seabed game.

•

In addition, when conflict arose regardless of it geographic location, the U.S. Navy has to
be able to move out of the CONUS homeports, through U.S. home waters out into the open
ocean unhindered and before it could prepare to fight its way into the away battlespace. Seabed warfare demands the Navy fight its way to the open ocean and continue the fight even
while adversaries were in the U.S. Navy’s flanks and rear—the CONUS home waters— all
enabled by seabed capabilities.

•

The basic assumption of air and surface supremacy in all of the Navy’s and Joint Forces’
planning is invalid in the face of Chinese and Russian capabilities. The experiences of 15 or
more years fighting near and over Iraq and Afghanistan does not apply in the western Pacific
and Baltic waters.

•

Aviators have to re-learn how to suppress enemy air defenses, and re-learn how to fight in the
face of a competent adversary—how to take hits and losses, and keep on fighting. Surface
warriors had to learn how to fight despite being “out-sticked” by longer-range and better-capability weapons.

•

The basic assumption that was used in the design, procurement, and tactical operations of U.S.
Submarine Force—“owning” the top 1,000 feet or so of the water column ensured undersea
supremacy anywhere in the world, and allowed the execution of sea denial to surface forces
everywhere— now invalid, ineffective and wrong, will no longer be useful and will be counterproductive.

•

From the end of the first Cold War, the Navy and the Submarine Force “whistled past the
graveyard,” routinely dismissing out of hand the threat from sea mines.
Nations and commercial entities will routinely map underwater terrain to support their
interests and activities, usually down to the sub-meter resolution, and covering nearly 85
percent of the world’s oceans. This level of detail allows detailed planning for and placement of systems and devices on the ocean floor, undetectable and immune from attack.

•

The proliferation of commercially developed undersea and seabed systems make them readily available to anyone with even a modest amount of funding. These systems had long ago
departed being a resource only for a rich nation-state.

•

And, non-U.S. militaries and nonmilitary security forces were quick to procure and modify
the commercial undersea and seabed systems for their uses.

•

Some systems will be capable against other seabed systems or other undersea systems. Other
seabed systems will be designed and deployed to use against surface, air, and land systems—
bringing another cross- or multidomain dimension to warfare. Naval forces will be forced to
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consider not only the role of seabed and undersea forces in warfare on the seabed and in the
undersea, but also the role of those forces in warfare on the sea surface, in the air and space,
and on land.
•

The U. S. Submarine Force will have to abandon its assumption that being in the undersea
made submarines immune from attack from anywhere except in the undersea. The interrelationship amongst the warfighting domains made the cross-domain approaches of Combined
Arms ASW from the Cold War look like simple arithmetic in comparison to advanced algebra.

•

The USN Submarine Force and its other undersea and seabed forces have to prepare to compete—fight—against a bunch of adversaries for every part of the undersea and seabed.

•

Three technologies are especially important to making the ocean informationally transparent
and causing the evaporation of submarine stealth: quantum sensors, neutrino sensors, and
living sensors.

RECOMMENDATION
The fundamental conduct of warfare in the undersea is changing significantly, and doing so in
a perfectly predictable manner to include the seabed. This change warrants equally significant
changes in the forces and systems that will fight in the undersea and on the seabed in the second
half of the 21st century. The DOD should act now to take up the challenge of being able to compete in the deep undersea and on the seabed.
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AMPHIBIOUS WARSHIPS IN THE SEA-CONTROL BATTLE
BACKGROUND
Statement of the problem: (1) current U.S. naval forces do not possess the weapons inventory to
conduct the volume of fire necessary for a high-intensity engagement against a militarily-capable
regional power in a near sea; (2) such an engagement will require strikes against land-based targets, reducing the focus available for sea control mission areas; (3) weapons resupply of engaged
combatants is difficult in a high-intensity engagement without removal of the combatants; (4)
current fleet size requires deployment of the majority of USN assets to the region of engagement,
exposing other regions of interest to exploitation; (5) combatants cannot be simultaneously tasked
with providing protection to amphibious/expeditionary forces.

DISCUSSION
•

A low-cost potential solution for increasing deployed weapons volume in either a land strike
or sea control situation is by installing strike weapons on existing platforms that are not currently equipped. This would also accord with the concept of “distributed lethality.”

•

The Littoral Combat Ship cannot satisfy this requirement without significant increase in
range, an ability to operate for extended periods at sea, and extensive reconfiguration.

•

Given volume, manning, and C2 capabilities, existing amphibious warships (particularly
LPDs and LSDs) appear the best candidates for such a distributed lethality extension.

•

During the Cold War, the U.S. Navy gained practical experience in the installation of box and
canister launchers on ships, providing them with antiship and land strike capabilities.

•

In 1997, the U.S. Marine Corps tested the at-sea employment of “high-mobility artillery
rockets” (HIMARS) fired from a road-mobile launcher griped to the deck of USS Anchorage
(LPD-23) against a land target.

•

Commandant, USMC has suggested that the HIMARS launcher can be eventually equipped
with antiship missiles.

•

In the open arms market, Russia proposed sales of the KLUB-K system, a missile-launching
system contained within a standard multimodal container (CONEX) box that can be accommodated by most merchant container-ships and griped to the decks of amphibious warships.

•

Box, canister, and container launchers—along with the necessary C2—can be added to existing
ships at a fraction of the cost of back-fitting vertical launch tubes (VLS) or new construction.
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•

Although such installations may not provide the more extensive capabilities of CGs/DDGs,
they can augment fleet capabilities, with CGs/DDGs, E-2Ds, or other airborne system providing targeting data and midcourse correction directly to the missiles.

OBSERVATIONS
•

In order to employ amphibious warships in multi-mission operations, USN and USMC will
need to overcome ingrained limits to current doctrine concerning the employment of amphibious warships.

•

USN surface force will need to overcome existing “tribal cultures” that separate cruisers-destroyers (CRUDES) and amphibious forces and inhibits the multimission use of amphibious
warships.

•

Since the war-at-sea capabilities of amphibious warships that are back-fitted with box/canister
launchers would be inherently less than those of VLS-equipped CGs/DDGs, an alternative
method of employment would be for amphibious warships to replace DDGs within other
COCOM areas of responsibility (AORs) in order to allow the CRUDES force to concentrate
on an area or crisis. For example, LSDs/LPDs could replace DDGs and perform sea-control
missions in the CENTCOM AOR in the event of a crisis in the Pacific.

RECOMMENDATIONS
•

USN should immediately conduct a series of experiments utilizing existing box/canister and
land-mobile launchers onboard amphibious warships to determine effective employment, C2
and tactics in their use in sea-control and land-attack missions.

•

Following installation on amphibious warships, USN should proceed beyond the current
planning and cultural limits to “distributed lethality” and immediately conduct experimentation, engineering, and tactical studies for employment of box/canister launchers on all USN/
USNS vessels capable of installation (excepting hospital ships).
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ADDING SEA-BASED INTERMEDIATE-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES
(IRBMs) TO THE U.S. NAVY FUTURE FLEET*
BACKGROUND / STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
•

Antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) systems appear to be forcing U.S. Naval surface forces away from
the littoral regions. Emblematic of that is the (perceived) threat posed by the PLA DF-21D/DF-26
antiship ballistic missiles. Both missiles fall under the category of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) as defined by the INF Treaty, which covers missiles with a range of 1000–5500
kilometers (622–3418 land miles). Note: The A2/AD term will be used in this assessment
because it is a well-recognized acronym with DoD. However, as identified by the CNO, there
are problematic implications for the term.

•

Operations research conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School indicates that naval warfare favors the side that can “attack effectively first” (particularly in the missile age), but the
range of A2/AD weapons exceeds that of U.S. Naval aviation, forcing U.S. Naval air and
surface forces to operate on the defensive as they comes within strike range. SSN/SSGNs can
operate within the opponents A2/AD envelope, but the number of the platforms are limited
and will necessarily be expected to carry out other missions.

•

Naval strike weapons that can attack from outside A2/AD range, such as sea-launched cruise
missiles (Tomahawk) are precise, but not timely, and appear to have limited capabilities
against mobile and buried/hardened targets. This includes Tomahawks carried on SSN/SSGNs.
Tomahawk speed-to-target is roughly Mach 0.7. In contrast, IRBMs (such as DF-21/26) can
achieve post-boost phase speeds of Mach 20 (actual speed-over-ground is somewhat lower).

The relatively slow speed of Tomahawk has been perceived as a weakness in that weapon’s use
during the war on terrorism (particularly operations in Afghanistan). Although Tomahawk has
been used against fixed targets, such a terrorist training camp infrastructure, its speed has limited
its use against real-time mobile targets such as terrorist personnel. This has prompted support for
a prompt global strike (PGS) system of conventionally armed intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) to be fired from the continental U.S. against terrorist targets. Such a system, however,
would have serious implications for nuclear arms control and might be considered limited by
current treaties (START).
•

The U.S. Navy currently does not possess a weapon that can conduct prompt strike against
mobile or hardened targets from outside the A2/AD range of potential opponents. Such
strikes would rely on carrier aviation or joint assets.

•

Current carrier strike aircraft (F/A-18E/F) have an approximate combat radius of 390 nautical
miles (NM)/722 kilometers (km) without aerial tanking. F-35C rated combat radius is 600
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NM/1112 km without aerial tanking. Combat radius varies based on weapons load. Current per unit acquisition cost of F-35C is estimated at $116 million. [Note: Life-cycle costs
for manned aircraft far exceeds that of missiles.] PLA DF-21D range is estimated at 780
NM/1450 km. Extending the range of strike aircraft in the future is possible; older carrier
strike aircraft had rated unrefueled combat radii in excess of 1000 NM.

DISCUSSION
•

A conventionally armed (nonnuclear) sea-based IRBM capability for surface warships and
submarines holds the potential to out-range the PLA land-based missiles and provide an
effective counterbattery strike capability, thereby enhancing regional deterrence. The primary
purpose would be strikes against land targets, but such a weapon could be directed against
opposing fleet concentration areas. (This statement assumes the existence of sensors and battle-management systems necessary for effective targeting.)

•

There are no arms-control treaties or international laws that restrict the construction and deployment of sea-based IRBMs (whether conventionally or nuclear armed). It is possible that
development of sea-based IRBMs may facilitate the creation of a future regional arms-control
regime in similar fashion to those governing nuclear-capable land-based IRBMs and groundlaunched cruise missiles in Europe.

•

On 2 November 2017, the U.S. Navy Strategic Systems Program reported that an unarmed
submarine-launched (intercontinental) ballistic missile (SLBM) was launched from an Ohioclass nuclear guided missile submarine (SSGN) to test a naval option for the “conventional
prompt global strike capability.” The use of nuclear-capable intercontinental range SLBMs
for conventional strike is an alternative that is perceived as problematic for the prevention of
nuclear escalation. However, it would appear that the capability of launching a conventionally-armed SLBM is similar to the capability to launch a conventionally-armed IRBM.

•

A conventionally armed, sea-based IRBM based on the design of the former land-based
Pershing II missile may be a cost-effective solution in comparison with other technologies.
IRBMs represent mature technologies that do not require an extensive research-and- development cycle. However, engineering a land-based Pershing II-type missile to operate at sea
would involve technical risk, and many aspects of the effort would require extensive technical
studies.

•

Without extensive technical studies it is impossible to estimate the development and per unit
costs of sea-based IRBMS. However, a MITRE report provides a per unit cost estimate of
$15 million. Per unit cost for Pershing II converted to 2017 dollars was $19 million.

•

It is conceivable that deploying sea-based IRBMs in deck-mounted box launchers might
allow their integration in existing U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Naval Service (USNS) ships,
precluding the need to design specialized platforms.

•

It is conceivable that a smaller, sea-based IRBM might be developed using modern digital
and miniaturization technologies that could fit the Mk 41 VLS launcher.
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•

Integration of sea-based IRBM fire control into current naval tactical networks to enable effective use against real-time targets is difficult (as with other over-the-horizon weapons systems), but certainly not an insurmountable engineering challenge. There are various methods
of systems integration; similarly, there are alternative methods of targeting and control.

RECOMMENDATIONS
•

OPNAV N3/5 should conduct a study of the effects of including sea-based IRBMs in the future fleet in terms of strategic requirements.

•

OPNAV N8 should conduct campaign analysis and modeling related to the integration of seabased IRBMs into the future fleet architecture.

•

OPNAV N9 should initiate discussions concerning the appropriate sponsor of a sea-based
IRBM program and how such a program would develop across weapons and platform-sponsor
boundaries.

•

Commander, Naval Surface Force (COMNAVSURFOR) should initiate a series of experiments in employing ground mobile missile systems—beginning with relatively small and
short-range missiles—on USN and USNS ships.

•

Commander, Naval Submarine Force (COMNAVSUBFOR) and/or other appropriate undersea warfare commands should examine the feasibility of converting Ohio-class submarines to
conventional IRBM launch platforms, similar to their conversion to cruise missile SSGNs.

•

Commander, Naval Air Systems Command should begin preliminary technical feasibility
studies on the adaptation of Pershing II-type systems for sea launch.

•

Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) should begin preliminary technical
feasibility studies and analysis of alternatives for sea-basing IRBMs on existing vessels and
future designs.

* A more detailed analysis of this proposal (including alternatives, costs, and risks) is available as
NWC Institute for Future Warfare Studies Working Paper #1-17-1a.
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SHIFTING FROM SEA CONTROL TO OCEAN/GLOBAL COMMONS
CONTROL: PREVENTING PRC GLOBAL MARITIME OPERATIONS
BACKGROUND / STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
•

The U.S. cannot achieve sea control in the South China Sea (SCS) without striking land targets in mainland China (PRC).
‒The primary threats to the U.S. Navy in the SCS are People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
Rocket Forces and land-based tactical aviation, not the People’s Liberation Army Navy
(PLAN). The PRC will attempt “to use the land to control the sea.”*
‒PLAN does not need to sortie for the PRC to conduct sea-denial operations in the SCS.

•

Neutralization of the artificial islands in the Spratly area can mitigate PLA sea-denial capabilities in the southern SCS, but the volume of PLA weapons likely makes the northern area
untenable.

•

However, the U.S. Navy can conduct sea-denial operations in SCS, ensuring that the PLAN
cannot operate without attrition, and preventing resupply of the artificial islands.

•

Sea-denial capability may be sufficient to deter PRC/PLA regional intimidation.

•

Nevertheless, NCA may consider a potentially stalemated conflict within the confines of SCS
as not in the U.S. interest, ceding de factor control over the SCS in face of the threat of conflict.

DISCUSSION
•

Although the PRC can achieve denial and possibly dominance in near seas (SCS), geography ensures that it must transit the choke points and limited waters of the “first (and second)
island chain.”
‒When PRC commentators first used the term “first island chain,” they did not refer to PLA
antiaccess capabilities, but to the ability for opponents to close the oceans/maritime commons
to the PLAN.

RECOMMENDATIONS
•

USN should refocus its investment in attempting to ensure the capability needed to achieve
sea control over the SCS, and instead focus on creating a GUIK-type barrier to PLAN deployment beyond the first island chain in any conflict.
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•

Having a barrier that includes fixed SOSUS follow-on installations, forward-deployed forces,
routine area operations, and firm alliance relations would ensure that the PRC recognizes that
their access to the global maritime commons in peacetime is at the sufferance of the U.S. and
its allies, thereby having a conventional deterrence effect.
‒The U.S. found this a successful approach in the Cold War.
‒Potentially this is a less costly strategy than the major increase in weapons and platforms
required to achieve sea control in the SCS.
‒Although the PRC may seek to construct land trade and resource routes, the costs of such
infrastructure dwarfs the costs of maritime transport, thereby forcing the PRC to spend resources that could be invested in military growth.

•

The key element of an ocean/global maritime commons denial strategy is maintaining the
trust and cooperation of regional allies and assuring them of U.S. support in any conflict with
the PRC.
‒This requires maintaining combat-credible naval (and joint military) power in the region.
‒This may also require diplomatically “taking sides” in SCS and East China Sea disputes,
something the U.S. government has thus far avoided.

* Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, “Using the Land to Control the Sea? Chinese Analysts
Consider the Anti- Ship Ballistic Missile,” Naval War College Review 62, no. 4 (Autumn 2009),
pp. 53–86.
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UTILIZING A PROTOTYPE MOBILE OFFSHORE BASE (MOB) TO
REESTABLISH GLOBAL NORMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
BACKGROUND
Statement of the problem:
• In violation of international law and global norms, the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
has essentially “captured” the South China Sea (SCS). While not interfering—at least at
present—with most commercial transit, PRC law has declared the South China Sea to be the
equivalent of territorial waters.
•

PRC has constructed a series of islands on reefs and awash shallows within international waters and within the disputed Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of other nations. These artificial islands—sometimes dubbed the “great wall of sand”—have runways and are armed with
antiair weapons, with indications that tunnels for additional weapons and hardened shelters
for strike missiles are now being built.1

•

In order to counter PRC claims, the U.S. Navy conducts a series of freedom of navigation
(FON) operations, a practice that it has conducted many times over the years to challenge the
(il)legality of such claims. However, FON ops are by necessity short-term actions that no
longer seem to achieve the public-diplomatic effect of the Cold War era and even the recent
past.2 As necessary as they may be from an international legal perspective, they are slowly
becoming but a part of the background noise of the narrative.3 If the PRC wants to relegate
them completely to the background noise, all it has to do is ignore the FONs. (Only lawyers
would remember.)

Potential solution:
• A potentially low-cost, albeit higher-risk solution would be for the U.S. and its allies to take
“bit-more-permanent” approach to reestablishing law and norms and emplace a mobile offshore base (MOB) to create an “island of freedom” in the SCS. The likely position would be
100 miles from nearest land on the Macclesfield Bank or in Dangerous Ground to the west of
Palawan, Philippines.
•

This MOB—a concept discussed in the late 1990s—could start as a single (inoperative) oil rig
manned by a “peace contingent” of U.S. and partner Coast Guardsmen and NOAA civilians.
Officially it would be an aid to navigation in what is indeed very dangerous ground.

DISCUSSION
•

The concept of large mobile offshore bases—as a means of maritime presence and projecting joint forces into a region of crises—gained temporary prominence through the writings of
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then-JCS Vice Chairman Admiral Bill Owens in the mid-1990s. As conceived by Admiral
Owens, MOBs (also referred to as Joint Mobile Offshore Bases) would be “built from the
experience and technology associated with offshore oil-drilling platforms…perhaps we would
build them by assembling components that arrive separately in the region of concern.”4
•

At the high end, proponents envisioned linked-together oil rig–type platforms (generally
self-stabilizing and not bottom-tethered) that could create runways long enough to land C-140,
or even C-17 aircraft (6000-ft length).

•

The technology necessary to link several floating oil rig platforms was demonstrated and
experiments and studies were conducted (some funded by the Office of Naval Research) that
suggested such links—combined with self-positioning propulsion—could prove effective
even in challenging sea states.5

•

However, the initial effort would consist of a single used oil platform (minus all oil-drilling
equipment), with the potential of increasing the size if necessary for the effort at tacit negotiations. The ultimate goal is to induce the PRC to reduce their military presence on their
artificial islands and acknowledge global norms in the SCS.

•

There is currently a glut of used/decommissioned oil rigs on the market, with auction prices
dipping to 10% of the original construction costs.

OBSERVATIONS
•

A sovereign vessel/platform positioned in an area in which there is no exposed land and conducting nonmilitary missions that does not exploit resources considered protected by an EEZ
is protected under international law.

•

For the purposes of controlling the narrative, the U.S. government could express interest in
turning the platform over to an international organization as an “island of peace.”

•

The action would represent the willingness of the U.S. to act in a relatively nonconfrontational
way and reassure the smaller states that the U.S. will not allow international law to devolve
into a Melian dialog.

•

It would buttress FON operations with a permanent regional presence.

•

It would be designed as a bargaining chip; if the PRC is uncomfortable with such a platform
emplaced in the SCS (and the potential for others), it could consider down-scoping its presence on the artificial islands.

•

It represents a tool for “escalating to deescalate,” a tactic now associated with Russian foreign
policy, but which has less-nefarious potential.

RISKS
The state-run PRC media and proxies will “scream bloody murder” in denouncing the action—“U.S./Western imperialism,” “affronts to Chinese sovereignty,” continuation of the “100
years of humiliation”—all the rhetoric routinely used when another nation takes any action the
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PRC dislikes. In response, world media will profess shock and concern with alarmist reports that
“war might be imminent” and that the U.S. is being unnecessarily provocative. (Theater like that
sells advertising.)
•

Obviously, most important is the physical reaction of the PRC government. Critics of this
proposal would see an immediate and escalating confrontation, with PRC vessels blockading
and forces storming the platform. Such an action would indeed by a horrendous result, but
strategic positioning of naval assets in international waters should mitigate this threat.

•

The question is: would the PRC threaten war with the United States because of a platform
sitting in what the rest of the world considers international waters, when the consequences are
predictable:
‒Disruption of the PRC’s international trade
‒Probable nuclearization of Japan and other Asian states
‒A permanent Western effort to contain the PRC, in the style of the Cold War
‒Potential internal Chinese discord that could challenge the CCP’s absolute control on political power. (Many in the new mainland Chinese business community may not see drastic
action in their interest, patriotism or not.)

•

The MOB would be continually subject to harassment and interference by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), PRC coast guard agencies, and the maritime militia.
‒However, the reality is that such dangers already exist in the region, with PLA aircrews
killed and American crews endangered, not to mention the many other national fleets that
have been harassed.
‒It is possible that harassment would increase in intensity, but since such activity has become
“normalized” in the South China Sea, it could increase in intensity at any moment, MOB
emplaced or not.

RECOMMENDATIONS
•

The U.S. should emplace an “island of freedom and peace” in the SCS.

•

The initial MOB platform would remain demilitarized, with the exception of water cannon
and the normal protective arms carried by the U.S. Coast Guard, and be rated as an aid to
navigation and research platform. It should not appear capable of exploiting undersea resources, although it could support environmental research. Protection from harassment should be
provided by the U.S. Navy in the current manner in which it operates in the SCS.

•

The U.S. should restart research and development in major MOB technologies, developing
the ability to expand the demilitarized platform into an actual military-capable MOB—analogous to what the PRC has done in the Paracels and Spratleys.

•

The U.S. should commence negotiations: if the PRC wants to expand their activities to close
the South China Sea, the U.S. could expand its activities to keep it open. If the PRC wishes
to reduce potential tensions, it could stop constructing artificial islands, demilitarize them,
and turn their control over to an international organization.
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•

In comparison to large military acquisition programs and operations, the cost of buying, refurbishing, towing, and maintaining the platform/MOB would be nominal.

•

As part of the diplomatic effort, the U.S. should make it clear that it intends to eventually
turn control of the platform over to the United Nations or the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), if the PRC indicates a sincere willingness to negotiate on an end to island
building and militarization.

NOTES:
1. Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “A Constructive Year for Chinese Base Building,” December 14, 2017, https://amti.csis.org/constructive-year-Chinese-building
2. An argument that the “consistent practice of free navigation” is as effective (or not) as formal
FON operations can be found in Peter A. Dutton and Isaac B. Kardon, “Forget the FONOPs—
Just Fly, Sail, Operate Wherever International Law Allows,” Lawfare (blog), June 10, 2017,
https://lawfareblog.com/forget-fonops-%E2%80%94- just-fly-sail-and-operate-whereever
-international-law-allows.
3. See discussion in Ralph Jennings, “China Calmed Asian Maritime Dispute in 2017 without
Ceding Sovereignty,” Voice of America News, December 11, 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/
south-china-sea-disputes-calming- down/4158167.html.
4. Admiral William A. Owens, USN, High Seas: The Naval Passage to an Uncharted World
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), pp. 162–63.
5. Studies include: Ronald N. Kostoff, Floating Ocean Platform (Office of Naval Research, c.
1991), Anouck R. Girard, et al., An Experimental Testbed for Mobile Offshore Base Control
Concepts (Berkeley: Univ. of California, 2001), https://whale.fe.up.pt/Papers/2001/PAPER
_HAWAII2001.pdf, and W. L. Greer, project leader, Mobile Offshore Base Operational Utility and
Cost Study, IDA Paper P-3573 (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, January 2001).
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TRANSCENDENT WARS OF THE 21st CENTURY
BACKGROUND
•

Competition is fundamental to evolutionary life, conflict habitual to human nature. Ours is a
history of shared interests and disputed differences, a collective heritage cultivated through
progressive partnerships of cooperation and commerce, yet punctuated by the exclamations of
war and conquest.

•

Acknowledging that force inevitably begets force, military strength in mutually assured destructive balance has now manifested more than a half century of global armistice, despite
disrupting outbursts of regional instability that previously might have conscripted allies into
broader conflict. Though we continue to live under the shadow of nuclear confrontation, it is
this assured response of overwhelming retaliatory devastation that has served well in preserving international security and our domestic welfare.

•

But today something fundamental has changed. Projections of past strategic concepts of domain dominance and force deployment are increasingly antiquated in a world of geographic
inconsequence, non-nation-state actors, global information connectivity, and exponential
technological change.

•

Resultant emerging technologies inevitably precipitate new opportunities and new threats.
Radical new technologies are appearing at the convergence of accelerating progress in nanotechnologies, biotechnologies, and information technologies. They express themselves in
applications exploiting advanced molecular materials, microfabrication, genetic engineering,
robotics, artificial intelligence and quantum computing. Their accompanying innovations
already can be recognized in the expansive “internet of things,” the omniscient informatics
of big data, the ominous creations of synthetic biology, and the promises and perils of autonomous thinking machines. Their new domains of operation extend from cyberspace to outer
space, and into the neuroscience of our minds.

Advanced technology weapons are becoming smaller, faster, cheaper, smarter and increasingly
autonomous, more (or less) lethal, distributed, resilient, adaptable, and accessible.
•

We have reached an inflection point of transcendent technological advantage that alters the
foundational principles of deterrence, domain supremacy and operational warfare. Conventional force deployment and utilization are increasingly vulnerable to countermanding attack
using emerging technology weapons.

•

Furthermore, such military advancements are no longer the primary stimulus for disruptive
technology research and development, but increasingly exploit adaptations of innovation migrating first from the readily accessible commercial sector.
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•

Also notably, the speed of appearance, adoption and adaptation of these new weapons systems
far outpaces current practices for traditional military technology acquisition and deployment.

•

Across all domains of war, technology accelerates exponentially. Unilateral dominance at all
times across all potential domains of conflict - land, sea, air, space and cyberspace – is unsustainable without unrealistically substantial investments of financial and intellectual capital.
How will our national defense strategies adjust in a volatile world of unstable balances, with
adversaries who in some domains of conflict for some periods of time may hold superior,
even potentially decisive, advantage?

DISCUSSION
•

In the dynamic domain of space, remote-sensing technologies, especially those deployed using
small satellite swarms at low Earth orbit, allow continuous detection, location and monitoring
of conventional warfighting assets for friends and foes alike.

•

Besides ensuring the militarization of near-Earth space, such observational information
makes large deployed platforms such as aircraft carriers highly vulnerable if not operationally
impractical.

•

Even our most secure nuclear deterrent asset, submerged nuclear submarines, will soon become trackable and susceptible to attack.

•

In this near future, the scales of military action and counteraction, of risk and cost, of threat
and consequence, collectively will become dangerously imbalanced.

•

Quietly, the next world war may have already begun, to be found on the battlefields of information.

•

Beyond conventional warfare, the intrinsic dependence of civilian and military systems and
supporting infrastructures on operations in cyberspace open whole new pathways for information gathering and operational exploitation, disruption and harm.

•

Cyberwarfare already occurs today, though still below the threshold of direct kinetic conflict.
It has become a competitive domain unto itself, and is increasingly recognized as a dynamic
component of conflict in all other warfighting domains as well.

•

Moreover, in unconstrained warfare, sustained information dominance across the electromagnetic spectrum may not be possible.

•

Similarly, the material logistics of war are evolving rapidly. In nanotechnologies, emergent
molecular materials unimagined even a decade ago are beginning to revolutionize the design
and construction of new civilian and military systems, especially as controls over electromagnetics, photonics and heat. Already advanced manufacturing technologies such as 3-D printing enable on-location on-demand delivery of essential equipment and parts while bypassing
traditional supply chain logistics and associated limitations. Additionally, microfabrication
technologies support the rapid construction of self-configuring nanobots operating with distributed intelligence on miniature to molecular scales, with a growing inventory of achievable
tasks and applications.
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•

In biotechnology, repair or whole replacement of injured and diseased organs is near, both
from use of engineered prosthetics and the promise of undifferentiated stem cell therapies.
More profoundly, we are now moving beyond simply reading genetic code to effectively writing new code. In the emergent field of synthetic biology, code writers can make use of a genetic alphabet supplemented beyond the traditional four nucleotide bases bequeathed to us by
natural evolution. In addition to supporting genetic refinements and innovative treatments for
medical conditions and diseases, these synthetic biology applications can also create unconstrained designer variations of lethal or debilitating pathogens with extended latency, against
which we have no human immunity and no immediate preventive or remediating treatments.
Associated biological weapons can be created in small research laboratories and delivered to
target populations using nothing more sophisticated than a jar full of mosquitoes. How will
we respond when such technologies are used to incapacitate military forces or to carry out
ethnically targeted genocide with genetic identity precision?

•

Arguably the greatest emerging technological threat and greatest ascending opportunity is in
the field of artificial intelligence. Machines learning from us, with us, and ultimately without
us, represent the transcendence of sentient intelligence beyond the limitations of our biological brains. All that we have achieved as humans has been accomplished using a biocomputer
that operates with an 8Hz central processor and inefficient peripheral interfaces, requires
continuous oxygen and chemical energy supplies, suffers substantial maintenance down time
(normally about eight hours every day) with faulty neuro-wiring and high error rate performance, and must withstand a soft-target susceptibility to injury or destruction.

RECOMMENDATIONS
•

Of immediate importance, we must find new and compelling deterrents to the perceived advantages of preemptive first strike and technological extortions for geopolitical submission or
the world may once again find itself at the brink of war.

•

We should work resolutely with all nations invested in space activities to expand cooperative
partnerships, extend “open skies” policies and develop international space law standards that
emulate our maritime “open seas” agreements.

•

Command, control and communications are increasingly subject to interception, distortion or
denial. In the absence of such reliable information connectivity, mission-centered leadership
and quasi-autonomous decision-making will be vital for operational success. Concurrently,
we will require a force structure that supports both agile joint service leadership operating
across all domains, and deep technological expertise for personnel operating within those
domains.

•

Furthermore, in any coming conflict, the creative energy for rapid innovation that is a defining characteristic of many American technology companies today will be as important a
national asset as was our manufacturing industrial base throughout World War II. Specifically, the purposeful partnership and integration of civilian and military space and cyberspace
industries should not wait.
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•

The “stuff of war” will be dramatically different even a decade from now, but only if we embrace the exponential pace of change reinventing the material world.

•

While our attention and strategic investments principally have been focused on incremental
projections of past warfighting concepts into the near future, new domains of emergent warfare have arisen that promise soon to eclipse our essential understanding of conflict and its
conduct. “Breaking the mold” of incremental thinking and projections of existing force structure challenges us to recognize that we must not simply “think out of the box,” but appreciate
that in the very near technologically accelerating future, “the box” no longer exists. And with
this understanding comes the questions that we truly need to be asking.
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EMPLOYING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI) IN NAVAL WARFARE
(NOT NAVAL WEAPONS)
BACKGROUND
•

We have a long way to go before we can have a reliable AI in the cockpits, conning towers
and on the bridges of our future Fleet. Regardless of the seemingly insurmountable resource
investment in time, effort hardware and money, we must start the process now in order to
identify the challenges and limitations, learn from mistakes, wrestle with legal and policy
questions (which must also be identified), catch up to our adversary, and be prepared to use
AI to win at sea.

•

State of Development:

DISCUSSION
•

IBM Watson vs. Jeopardy. After years of development, IBM’s AI defeated Jeopardy champions.

•

AlphaGo, AlphaGo Zero, AlphaGo Zero + Humans. Using the most ancient/difficult strategy board game, an AI was taught the game using previous matches (AlphaGo beat the Go
Champ 4 to 1), then given only the rules (AlphaGo Zero beat AlphaGo 100 to 0), then partnered with humans to become the best.

•

IBM Watson & Oncology. By feeding IBM’s Watson foundational works, training it through
analysis of answers, providing thousands of previous cases, and continuously adding to its
known literature, leading American oncologists have an AI that can save tremendous amounts
of time in the identification of cancer cure regimens. (Admittedly, there have been some challenges that IBM and oncologists are still working to solve on a global basis).

•

China’s AI-powered robot Xiaoyi passed the country’s medical licensing exam (before IBM
Watson).

•

The Good News: Capabilities are available and ready for partnering with institutions to start
humans’ and machines’ learning and knowledge refinement processes.

RECOMMENDATION
That the Navy partner with IBM to utilize Watson in the analysis of naval warfare, education,
and acquisition decisions using two steps and focusing on three application areas.
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•

Two Steps

1. Under a Cooperative Research & Development Agreement (CRADA), provide the corpus for
Naval Warfare and refine the machines’ understanding of the subject
2. Using historic examples of naval battles, further refine the machines’ expertise
•

Three Applications (‘*’ Indicates 1 or 2 recommended focus areas for the CRADA)

1. Wargaming & Warfighting
•

Use AI as a reference/advice tool. With the Naval War College’s library at its fingertips, it
can provide referenced answers to questions within seconds

•

Provide trained/refined AI to Fleet & Strike Group Staffs for plan development.

•

* Refinement of unmanned systems’ (UxS) mission planning and targeting algorithms to
drive mission success and target selection accuracy to acceptable levels

2. Education & Innovation
•

Introduce trained/refined AI into PXO/PCO, TAO & Staff Courses to begin the human education process and explore potential AI uses

•

Explore UxS TTP and AI assisted decision-making in mixed reality & gaming environments

•

Combined AI/UxS strike group in Norfolk (multinational?) for experimentation

3. Acquisition/Recruiting with Strategy
•

* Provide AI ‘rules’ for acquisition, allow the AI to produce an independent acquisition plan
& determine probability of success against 2045 adversary

•

Provide AI retention/attrition rates & validate/refine recruiting quotas using current fleet acquisition model & AI generated model

•

Challenges/Concerns: Job security (need for experts increases); copyright infringement (not
an issue in past AI endeavors); the subject is too vast and would take too long (what better
reason to start now!)

Bottom line: A trained & educated AI can provide timely, unemotional, unbiased assessments,
feedback, and recommendations through informed analytical rigor at scale. Humans determine
the worth of the AI’s input, but must then justify their own decisions as compared against the AI’s
referenced analysis.
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THE BIG IDEA: MODERN MULTIMISSION AIRSHIPS
BACKGROUND
•

1,000 cubic feet of helium can lift 65 pounds into the air.

•

In 1933, the rigid airship USS Macon (ZRS 5) used 7 million cubic feet of helium to carry
five Sparrow Hawk scout aircraft and a crew of 60 at speeds up to 75 knots over ranges of up
to 6,000 miles.

•

None of the 89,000 ships (in convoys) escorted by blimps in World War II were sunk.

•

On March 15, 1957, after having flown 9,448 miles in 264 hours (just over 10 days), the Snow
Bird (ZPG 2) landed at Naval Air Station Key West, Florida. The flight had crossed the Atlantic, flown over the western shores of Africa and Europe, and then crossed the Atlantic from
east to west. In the process it set new records for unrefueled distance and flight time. Airships
frequently flew when heavier-than-air planes were grounded due to bad weather.

•

In 1960, the Navy’s nonrigid ZPG-3W airship carried 100,000 pounds aloft using a 1.5 million cubic foot envelope. It carried a crew of 22 on missions of up to 58 hours of uninterrupted and unrefueled flight.

DISCUSSION
•

Lockheed Martin’s “skunk works” has been test-flying a hybrid airship prototype (P 791)
since 2006, and has recently received a contract to build 12 hybrid airships, each capable of
carrying a payload of 47,000 pounds (including up to 19 passengers) at a cruising speed of 60
knots with a range of 1,400 nautical miles.

Google co-founder Sergey Brin is currently constructing a $100-million rigid airship in the same
Moffatt Field hangar that housed the USS Macon more than nine decades ago. The purpose for
which the airship is being built has not been publicly announced, but use as a disaster response
vehicle and/or a private air yacht have been rumored.
United Kingdom’s Hybrid Air Vehicles, Ltd., is repurposing the aircraft built for the U.S. Army’s
Long Endurance Multi-Sensor Vehicle (LEMV), which was conceptualized as an unmanned ISR
platform designed to execute surveillance missions of up to three weeks over a given target. The
Airlander-10 is being converted into a manned passenger-carry aircraft.
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QUESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION:
1. Could a large-scale airship, utilizing modern materials, ballast-control systems, and lightweight
yet powerful engines, be used for the following?
a. Long-range and long-endurance maritime patrol.
b. Launching large quantities of missiles and/or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and UAV
swarms.
c. Heavy-lift cargo transportation at speeds faster than ships and at much reduced fuel costs
per ton-mile.
d. C4ISR missions. The large gas envelop and lifting capacity could support large antenna
arrays, huge sensor suites, and extended mission profiles.
.
2. Could such vehicles be survivable in combat and/or combat-support situations?
3. Could modern airships operate in weather conditions likely to be encountered in routine operations?
4. Could modern airships be operated in unmanned or optionally manned modes?
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THE FUTURE FORCE: BLUE HAIR IN THE GRAY ZONE*
BACKGROUND
What does the warrior of the future look like? What are the roles and missions the United States
will need to prepare its people for? What are the technologies those warriors must master in order
to succeed at their mission? According to the advocates of the Third Offset, the victors of future
war will be those states that are best able to harness autonomy and human-machine integration.
However, the Department of Defense is struggling with how to recruit and retain these best and
brightest of emerging technology. This discussion examines how military culture and perceptions
of what the military warrior looks like could impact the United States’ long term strategic competition with rising adversaries.

DISCUSSION
Third Offset, autonomy, and the future force:
•

Third Offset argues for a focus on autonomy. Harnessing autonomous research for national
defense will be the role of technologists, not technologies. The future force of warriors will
be made up of computer programmers, air defense commanders with expertise on the algorithms that undergird their weapon systems, sailors able to reconfigure battle networks while
taking fire, hackers in deployed locations and at home, and big-data analysts in forward operating bases and staff commands. Whether the future warriors are directing technology on the
battlefield or remotely, they will need to adapt to high-tech threats and high-tech machines in
real time.

•

Further, while manpower problems are often framed as an issue for existential conflicts,
solving manpower issues is increasingly vital to winning conflicts in the gray zone. Grayzone conflicts—defined by limited wars, coercive missions, and deterrence—are increasingly
dominated by technological innovation. Cyber, space, the electromagnetic spectrum, and
information are all contested on a day-to-day basis. Winning in the gray zone, unlike the large
armies of territorial conflict, is battled from long distances by remote operators who influence
and change adversary behaviors from behind keyboards instead of from gun sights.

•

Role of culture and society in perceptions of military caste. So much of what we as a society
think is a military warrior is based on our cultural understandings of what the military caste
looks like—a problem that may be exacerbated as the civil-military divide continues to grow.
Standards for tattoos, beards, hair length/color, and makeup for women have all changed over
time with changes in society and fashion.

•

Are physical fitness standards not tied to mission requirements also arbitrarily exclusive?
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RECOMMENDATION
•

Conduct reexamination of the kind of talent we need to win future wars
—How do we recruit this talent and retain them?
—What is their role (civilian, contractor, on the battlefield, at home) in war?
—Are they lawful combatants?

•

Continue to implement creative ways to on-board special talent into the military

•

Identify must-fill technology skill sets beyond “cyber” or “information assurance”
—I.e., network architects, software developers, artificial intelligence scientists, etc.

•

Develop a way to assess the qualitative technological capability of DoD employees

•

Examine whether physical fitness and grooming standards represent the needs of the mission,
not a perception of “discipline” or what a military member “should” look like

*A detailed discussion of this paper is published as: https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/blue-hair
-gray-zone/
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RETHINKING FORWARD PRESENCE AND FORWARD DEFENSE
BACKGROUND
The U.S. Navy is committed to providing forward presence and, in extremis, forward defense,
globally (although it focuses most closely on the European, Greater Middle Eastern, and western
Pacific AORs). Given the limited number of naval assets available, forward presence leads to
high operating tempos, forward-based forces, recruitment and retention issues, as well as demands
for greater numbers of platforms. Moreover, if deterrence fails and forward-deployed naval forces
must fight, the focus on fighting forward is a risky strategy. If war breaks out in an A2/AD environment while U.S. naval forces are conducting ordinary presence missions, the risks to the fleet
are high if fighting occurs inside the “range rings” or they are required to “fight their way back
in.” Rethinking forward presence/forward defense and adopting a different posture could lead to a
more effective and efficient way to use scarce USN resources and ensure that the battle of the first
salvo or a short-sharp fight does not endanger U.S. naval supremacy, regionally or globally.

DISCUSSION
•

Per the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS), great-power war is now the primary focus of U.S. naval forces

•

The two prospective great powers (China and Russia) and several so-called rogue states (e.g.,
Iran) possess advanced A2/AD systems and practice asymmetric tactics.

•

Within deep range of adversary land-based air and missile-reconnaissance-strike systems,
USN forces are highly vulnerable.

•

There is a trade-off between forward presence to reassure friends and allies and the operational requirements of deterring and winning wars against great powers deploying A2/AD
systems.

•

Taking a maximalist approach to the concept of operating forward leads to strategies, plans,
and acquisition approaches that are expensive and dangerous.

•

American national interests do not require forward presence, much less forward defense, in
the maritime domain.

RECOMMENDATION
The U.S. Navy should rethink how it supports the NSS and NDS. During the Cold War, the Navy
did not generally (with regularity) operate within close range of the Soviet Union. It should not
do so within certain geographic parameters with regard to China and Russia today.
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